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ABSTRACT
COMPETITIVE INTERACTION-THE INFLUENCE OF
STRATEGIC GROUP STRUCTURE
Sherry M. Burlingame
Old Dominion University
Director: Dr. Sara A. Morris

The assertion that competitive interaction is a central focus of business
strategy emerged from the Strategic Management Research Group (SMRG) at the
University of Maryland. The premise of this perspective is that competition among
firms can be modeled using communication theory to explain how firms in an
industry interact. Competition, in this framework, is represented as the series of
actions and counteractions, termed responses, that firms undertake to position
themselves in their industry.

Thus, in this model, interaction (actions and

responses) equates with competition. Studies conducted by the members of the
SMRG have outlined the relationship of key variables within the CommunicationInformation Processing Model of Competitive Interaction (CIP) to measures of
performance, a key outcome variable in strategic management research.
A factor that is hypothesized to influence the response variables within the
model is homophily--a concept which refers to the similarity of characteristics
between sender (the actor) and the receiver (the responder).

The proposed

relationship between homophily and response however, has been minimally
explored.

This study investigated the relationship between homophily and

response through the development and presentation a thesis that the strategic
group concept of firms within an industry (Hunt, 1972) can be used as a proxy for
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the homophily construct. This study investigated the influence that strategic groups
in an industry may have on the variables representing the competitive behavior of
firms in that industry, as captured by the Communication-lnformation Processing
Model of Competitive Interaction.
The intersections between the strategic group literature base and the
emerging theoretical and empirical literature of the Communication-lnformation
Processing Model of Competitive Interaction were presented and discussed. From
this discussion, testable hypotheses were developed in order to extend the theory
by explaining how the strategic group concept is associated with key variables of
the CIP model.

The tests of the hypotheses regarding the influence of the

strategic group construct on components of the Communication-lnformation
Processing Model of Competitive Interaction reveal that there is a relationship
between the similarity of strategic group membership of the actor and responder
and certain response characteristics central to the CIP model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Competition--in the sense of organizations jockeying for resources,
customers, markets and profits--is central to the discourse of business-related
fields of inquiry, such as economics, marketing and strategic management. The
field of strategic management has long been interested in competition among
firms in an industry. Indeed, much of the theoretical underpinnings of the field
suggest that firms select a domain in which to compete-i.e., choose a corporatelevel strategy--and then pursue means through which to compete in the chosen
domain--i.e., choose a business-level strategy

(Hofer & Schendel, 1978;

Bourgeois, 1980). The process of implementing and pursuing a business-level
strategy gives rise to competition in the industry as each firm moves to secure
resources and markets (Henderson, 1983), as well as to exploit opportunities and
minimize threats (Spender, 1985).
Embedded

in the

search

for

competitive

advantage,

competitive

interaction among firms in an industry is a fundamental, though
implicit, element of strategic management.

As

a firm

moves

generally
to

pursue

competitive advantage anticipated from its business-level strategy, so do others
in the industry. This pursuit of competitive advantage results in competitive
Journal model used: Academy o f M anagement Journal.
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interaction, or rivalry, as firms attempt to enhance their competitive position in
relation to each other vis a vis resources, capabilities, customers and revenues.
Barney (1991) implies that firms can compete away the gains of competitive
advantages that are not based on unique and inimitable resources. Rivals can
take action to copy perceived advantages. The focus on competition in strategy
research is readily apparent in articles concerning the pursuit and sustainability
of a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993a; Porter, 1985;).
Despite the suggested importance of competitive interaction-rivalry--to
the field, few studies have directly focused on the nature of interaction among
firms in an industry (Bettis & Weeks, 1987; Chen, 1988; Smith, Grimm &
Gannon, 1992; Peteraf, 1993, 1997).

In answer to the call made by Caves

(1984) to investigate the rivalrous moves among incumbent producers in an
industry, this study investigates competitive interaction in a specific focal
industry. This is accomplished through the application of the Communicationlnformation Processing (CIP) Model of Competitive Interaction.
The CIP model is based on communication-information processing theory.
The model, developed by Smith and Grimm (1991), elaborated by Smith, Grimm,
Gannon and Chen (1991) and applied primarily to large scale research in the
U.S. airline industry (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992; Chen, et al., 1992; 1994,
1995,) draws a parallel between the communication process (sender-messagereceiver) and competitive interaction (acting firm-action-responding firms). The
model and its ancillary propositions are currently under-tested.
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empirical tests have been conducted primarily in only one industry. This study
serves to extend the generalizability of the model to a different industrial sector.
A facet of the CIP model that is currently underdeveloped is the influence
of homophily--the degree of similarity-on key variables within the model. The
degree of homophily between firms is a characteristic influenced by industry
structure.

Industry structure is one dimension of the competitive environment

facing firms (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). The facet of industry structure that
is the focus of this study is the level of homogeneity among firms in a focal
industry (Aldrich, 1979; Cool & Schendel, 1988).

This study investigates the

influence of industry structure within the context of assessing competitive
interaction in an industry by specifically assessing a firm's placement within the
industry structure.

The strategic group construct (Bogner & Thomas, 1994;

McGee & Thomas, 1986; Porter, 1980) a construct within the industry structure
paradigm of Industrial-Organization Economics and Strategic Management,
captures the dimension of the competitive environment

represented

by

homogeneity. Groups represent the structure of the industry and firms are
positioned within a specific group (McGee & Thomas, 1986).

The strategic

groups in an industry are comprised of firms that are homogeneous along several
product/market and resource attributes.

This homogeneity begets homophily.

Homophily, defined as a similarity among entities in a system, has been identified
as both facilitating and inhibiting communication (Smith & Grimm, 1991).
The strategic group construct will be applied to the CIP model to
determine the construct's influence on competitive interaction. Feigenbaum,
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McGee and Thomas (1986) propose that studies of strategic groups can
contribute to an understanding of the strategic behavior of firms. The strategic
group construct represents the structure of the competitive environment in which
firms operate, and has had a central role in theory development and empirical
inquiry in the Strategic Management field (Day, Lewin, & Hongyu, 1995; Peteraf
& Shanley, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993). Firms within groups share a similarity of
assumptions about the potential of the industry (Porter, 1980). Firms in a group
also have a similarity of goals and the skills/resources to achieve those goals
(Caves & Porter, 1977).

Strategic groups are relevant to the line of inquiry

presented in this study as they are proposed in the literature to affect managers'
information search behaviors and the decision-making process used in strategy
formulation and implementation

(Harrigan, 1985; Porac & Thomas, 1990). A

firm's membership in a particular strategic group, therefore, should be a firm-level
characteristic that should influence competitive interaction (Peteraf & Shanley,
1997).

As will be discussed in the review of literature, the strategic group

construct is just beginning to be applied to questions of firm-level conduct and
behavior (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1993, 1994; Bogner, Pandian, & Thomas,
1994, Peteraf & Shanley 1997). In this study, the strategic group construct is
expected to have some degree of influence on the competitive behavior of firms
as captured by the CIP model.
Through the application of the theory of the CIP model of competitive
interaction and the methodology developed by Chen (1988) to operationalize its
constructs, several questions regarding the influence of the strategic group on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5
competitive behavior are addressed. These questions are related to the nature
of competition within and between groups, focusing on how firms in strategic
groups interact.

This type of inquiry is lacking in strategic group research

(Baum & Korn, 1996). The research questions pursued in this study are: (1) do
firms within strategic groups interact more intensively with each other or with
firms from other groups; (2) does group membership affect the time it takes for
firms to respond to a competitive move made by a firm in the industry; (3) does
group membership influence whether a firm imitates a competitive move; (4)
within the groups, can a hierarchical order of respondents be identified (i.e., is
one firm in a group predominately "first" in formulating responses consistently
followed by a sequence of other responding firms).
Through the pursuit of these questions this study makes several
contributions to the emerging literature which investigates the CIP model. In
addition to joining those few who have responded to the call made by Caves
(1984) to investigate rivalrous moves (Chen, 1988; Peteraf, 1993b), this study
responds to the challenge issued by Smith et al. (1992) and by Chen and
Hambrick (1995) to extend the application of the research inspired by the CIP
model of competition into other industrial sectors. Additionally, investigation of
the influence of strategic groups on competitive interaction behaviors serves to
probe the role that similarity between the actor and responder is expected to
have in the CIP model. This is an aspect of the CIP model which has not been
significantly addressed in previous research.
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The purpose of the current study, then, is to: (1) extend the application of
the CIP model of competitive interaction to a different industrial domain from
which it has been applied and subsequent theory developed, and (2) ascertain if
strategic groups, as a proxy for homophily, influence components of the CIP
model that can be characterized as manifestations of competitive behavior.
The remaining chapters proceed as follows.

Chapter 2 presents the

model of competitive interaction and its development from communication theory,
a summary of the empirical research on the CIP model, and a discussion of the
strategic group literature.

Chapter 3 presents the

intersection

of the

Communication-lnformation Processing Model of Competitive Interaction with the
theory base of the strategic groups literature.

This intersection provides the

basis of theory development for the hypotheses regarding the role of strategic
groups in competitive interaction in an industry and the relationships that are
expected to be observed among strategic groups in an industry.

The

methodology of the study is presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 the results of
the study are presented and these results are discussed in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This study draws upon the literature of two research streams within
Strategic Management: the Communication-lnformation Processing (CIP) Model
of Competitive Interaction and Strategic Group Theory.

The CIP model of

competitive interaction draws on the theory base of communication and
information processing within organizations, strategic issues management, and
environmental

scanning.

It views

competition

as

an

analogue

of

the

communication process--a non-verbal signal sent to receivers (other firms in the
industry) by means of a competitive action. A competitive action by a firm can
take many forms, but the purpose is generally to secure resources, improve
capabilities and/or acquire market share.

The action can be implemented

through such means a price increase, merger, expansion, long-term supply
contract, or new product development.
component of strategy implementation.

Competitive actions are an implicit
For example, in each of the business-

level strategies identified by Porter—differentiation, cost leadership, or niche
focus~it is expected that actions must be taken to implement the firm’s chosen
strategy. Research regarding the CIP model and its application is comparatively
new within Strategic Management research (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992).
In contrast, Strategic Group Theory (SGT)--the concept that there exists
in each industry groupings of firms in that follows similar strategic patterns and
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positions (Bogner & Thomas, 1993; Cool & Dierickx, 1993)--is a mainstay within
Strategic Management research. The strategic group is thought to have some
influence on the conduct of firms in an industry and, hence, on performance.
While this construct has been presented as framing a context for competition,
there has been scant empirical investigation of its influence on competitive
interaction (Peteraf, 1993b; Baum & Kom, 1996). The intersection of the CIP
model of competitive interaction and Strategic Group Theory of the Strategic
Management research base provides a fertile test-bed to further test the CIP
model. Specifically, does the existence of strategic groups influence competitive
interaction, as captured by the CIP model, in an industry?

Although this may

appear to be intuitively simplistic, the empirical research on strategic groups is
unclear as to their influence on competitive interaction in an industry.
The next section presents the CIP model of competitive interaction and the
supporting literature. The section following presents the relevant strategic group
literature.
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THE COMMUNICATION-INFORMATION PROCESSING MODEL
OF COMPETITIVE INTERACTION
This section presents and discusses the background and theoretical
development of the CIP model of competitive interaction, the terms and
constructs associated with it, and the empirical studies contributing to the model's
development.
Background and Development of the CIP Model
The CIP model of competitive interaction, based on communicationinformation theory, was developed by Smith and Grimm (1991) and applied in
empirical research, primarily in the U.S. airline industry, by Chen (1988), Smith,
et. al (1989, 1991, 1992) and Chen and colleagues (1991, 1992, 1994, 1995).
The core of the model is derived from the observed parallels of the
communication-information process between sender and receiver and the
competition process between firms (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). Since the
model is drawn from communication-information processing theory, the model
applies a communications perspective to explain and predict the behaviors
evident in competitive interaction among firms in an industry.
The CIP model of competitive interaction was developed by the Strategic
Management Research Group (SMRG) at the University of Maryland, consisting
of Frank Paine, Martin Gannon, Ken Smith, and Curtis Grimm and their doctoral
students.

These researchers were attempting to identify a more dynamic

conceptualization of strategy within the Strategic Management field. From their
deliberations they realized that the use and application of information underlies
the paradigm of the Strategic Management research base (Smith, Grimm,
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Gannon & Chen, 1991; Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). For example, to be a
cost leader the firm needs information on its costs, as well as information on its
competitors' costs. To follow a niche strategy, the firm needs information on the
current niches or the niches that can be created within an industry. It also needs
information regarding competitors' intentions regarding these segments.
The concept of information as relevant to Strategic Management is not
new (see, for example, Porter, 1980). The SMRG, however, went beyond the
Porterian application of information, to specifically demonstrate that the
competitive process, a manifestation of a firm's strategy, could be modeled by
the communication-information process. While the role of information is not new
to organization science, as is demonstrated and discussed in the next section,
the application of a communication model to capture the dynamics of the
competitive process between firms in an industry was a contribution that the
SMRG made to the field.
Information in Organizational Science-Rationale for the Cl Model
The existence of a communication-information processing perspective has
held central focus in organization science.

Information is a necessary input to

internal functions of the firm (Daft & Weick, 1984) such as planning and
controlling (Bateman & Zeithamel, 1996), decision making (Schwenk, 1984),
strategy formulation and implementation (Fahey & Narayanan, 1986), and
organization structure and design, as well as coordination and control (Galbraith,
1973). Information is also relevant to the external relationships that the firm has
with other entities in its environment (Porter, 1980).
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Several theories regarding how firms manage their relationship with their
environment implicitly suggest the central importance of information. Resource
Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), for example, focuses on the
relevance of information regarding external entities that play a role in the flow of
resources to the firm, and how this information influences how a firm chooses to
interact

with

these

entities.

Strategic

Information

Theory

(Dutton

&

Jackson,1987) relies on the information content of issues occurring in the firm's
environment, and how this information can affect the firm, either positively (i.e.,
opportunity) or negatively (i.e., threat). Competitor analysis (Porter, 1980; 1985)
also emphasizes the importance of information regarding competitors as a
component of the strategy formulation process
In viewing the organization or firm as an information processing system
(Daft & Weick, 1984), it is implied that the organization is comprised of structures
and personnel which receive information regarding internal processes and
external conditions and issues (Galbraith, 1973), interpret information, make
conclusions as to the potential effect on the firm (Dutton & Jackson, 1987), and
use information in decision-making processes regarding the firm’s alignment with
its environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Powell, 1992).

The use of

information in this manner may result in actions implemented by the firm intended
to alter the organization’s alignment with its environment.

Figure 1 depicts the

relationship between information, internal decision processes, and actions taken
by the firm. Some actions are specifically targeted to exploit a firm's competitive
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Figure 1
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advantage and augment its position relative to other firms in the industry
(Peteraf, 1993a; Baum & Korn, 1996).

Both internal and external information

have the potential to result in competitive actions through decision-making,
strategy formulation and implementation, and organization structure and design.
The resulting actions carry information to external entities (e.g., customers,
investors and competing firms) which, in turn, use the information to provide data
to their information-dependent organizational processes to formulate and
implement a response (Smith & Grimm, 1992). For example, if the firm’s actions
signal to a customer a price increase, the customer may attempt to negotiate a
long-term supply contract to lock in favorable terms.

Investors may bid up or

discount a firm’s share value based on the “news” carried in the firm's action. A
competitor may take a counter-action to nullify the advantage the acting firm was
seeking from the action (Peteraf, 1993a).
From the perspective of the CIP model, competition, which is also termed
competitive interaction in this literature base, is viewed as a dynamic information
exchange process which can be depicted as given in Figure 2:

Figure 2
Competition: A Dynamic Information Exchange Process

Action

Information * Response

Information ^ Response

The competitive behaviors of the actors and responders of the process depicted
in Figure 2 are influenced by factors that affect information exchange, such as,
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noise, structure and homophily (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1989; Smith & Grimm,
1992). As a dynamic information exchange process, competition is a series of
interactions motivated by the information content carried in a particular action,
and the assessment of that information by the decision makers of the firms that
have the potential to respond to the action (Smith, Grimm, Gannon & Chen,
1989; Smith & Grimm, 1992).
Competitive Interaction and the CIP Model
Interactions among firms have been characterized as being either
cooperative or competitive in nature (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991). The scope of
the research stimulated by the CIP model focuses on competitive interactions:
firms competing with other firms, through actions or responses to actions, in a
specified domain for growth or survival (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). In this
stream of research competitive interaction is defined as a dynamic process by
which industry participants compete with each other through the undertaking of a
series of competitive actions and responses to actions (Porter, 1980; Chen,
1989). The stream of research stemming from the CIP model uses as its levei of
analysis the competitive actions made by firms and the counteractions made in
response to actions (Smith & Grimm, 1992; Baum & Korn, 1996). The action is
viewed as the message being sent to receivers-other firms in the industry. An
action taken by a firm, and the response it triggers, are defined as a competitive
event which constitutes an interaction among firms.
The similarities between the communication-information process and the
competitive interaction process form the core of the CIP model and are displayed
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in Figure 3.

In the model competition is viewed as a form of communication

between parties. Smith and Grimm (1991) identify the basic components of the
CIP model as the actor and the characteristics of the actor; the action and
characteristics of the action; the responder and the characteristics of the
responder; a communication channel connecting the actor and the responder;
and, the competitive environment. The competitive environment introduces other
information and noise into the system.

Part of the information carried by the

competitive environment is information on the structure of the industry (Smith &
Grimm, 1992). This model has been applied primarily in empirical research on
the U.S. airline industry.
According to the CIP model, information regarding competitive intent is
communicated by the actions of firms in the industry and the response made to
those actions. As can be seen in Figure 3, the action is viewed as the message,
or signal, sent to receivers-other competitors in the industry. The "actor" is the
source and sends a "message" to other firms via an "action."

The "action"

conveys information to other firms. The "receivers" are other firms in the industry
and are potential “responders" to the message contained in the action. The
message carries information content as to the intent of the acting firm vis a vis
other firms in the industry, the degree of threat to the receiving firm(s), and the
area of competitive focus of this action-specific aspect of the firm’s business-level
strategy.
The "message" content of an action must pass through the "receiver’s"
sense-making process (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992; Daft & Weick, 1984). In
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Figure 3
The Communication-lnformation Processing Model of Competitive Interactions
(Smith, Grimm, and Gannon, 1992)
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general terms, this process has been described in the literature as being
performed by the upper echelon of an organization (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
The upper echelon is considered in practice and in the literature as monitoring
the environment (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Daft, Sormunnen & Parks, 1989;
Boyd & Fulk, 1995) and undertaking strategic decision making (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). The "receiver’s" decision makers assess the
information content of the action.

The "signal" from the acting firm, however,

may not always be received by other firms.
Failure to receive the message occurs due either to noise in the system or
lack of awareness of the action (Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1992; Chen &,
MacMillan, 1992). Just as in the communication process, if a message is not
received, a response cannot be formulated.

The model indicates that the

responder must have a level of "awareness" of the action for the message to be
received.

Thus, a lack of awareness of an action is a determinant of non

response to an action (Chen & MacMillan. 1992).
If a competing firm does receive the message, the sense-making process
requires that the actor and action characteristics be assessed for information
content. The receiving firm’s decision makers assess the message for the impact
on the firm. The information content regarding: (1) who the actor is; (2) how the
action alters the advantage of the acting firm, and (3) how the action affects the
competitive advantage of the receiving firm is assessed. These potential effects
are then considered in the upper echelon’s decision-making process (Henderson
& Nutt, 1983) and a decision is made to act upon the information conveyed in the
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action, or not. The “response" of the "responder" is further determined by the
firm's motivation to respond and the firm's capability to respond (Chen &
MacMillan, 1992).
If a response is made by a firm, the model identifies certain response
characteristics. These response characteristics are also affected by motivation
and capability (Chen & Miller, 1994). If a firm has the motivation to respond, but
does not have the capability, the firm may not be able to respond.

If it does

respond, the time elapsed between the action and the response, termed
response lag, will be longer than if the capabilities were in place. For example, a
price cut by firm A may be viewed as a threat and an attempt by the actor to
increase market share. Firms B and C are both aware and motivated to respond
to preempt the action. Firm B assesses that it has the capability to sustain a
price war and responds almost immediately.

Firm C, however, lacks the

capability and its response is delayed.
Terms and Definition of Constructs o f the CIP Model
With the concepts of the CIP model presented, a summary of the terms
and concepts of the model is in order. These terms and concepts are relevant to
the dependent and independent variables that are presented in the hypotheses
developed in Chapter 3 and the methodology presented in Chapter 4.
Actions and Actors. An action is defined as a specific and detectable
competitive move.

Actions convey messages regarding intent (e.g., acts to

extend market share, alter capabilities, or change source of competitive
advantage). Actors are those firms in the industry that undertake an action.
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Response and Responders. A response is a countermove, or counter
action, made to a specific action by a specific actor. The responder is the firm
undertaking a countermove or counteraction.
Actor and Responder Characteristics. These are characteristics of the
firm that acts or responds to an action. The organizational characteristics of both
the actor, such as size and reputation, and responder, such as strategic
orientation and organizational slack, have been found to influence the response
characteristics exhibited.
In viewing competitive interaction as a communication process, the
characteristics of the actor and the characteristics of the action carry information
content that must be interpreted by the receiver as it interprets the action and
formulates the decision to respond (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). Both actor
characteristics and responder characteristics were found to be determinants of
response characteristics (Chen & MacMillan, 1992).
Response characteristics.

There are several key dimensions to the

response construct that have been analyzed in competitive interaction research.
These are taken to reveal the response dynamics elicited by the characteristics
of the actor, action, and responder. These key dimensions are:
Response lag - the delay between action and response.
Response likelihood - the ratio of responses made by a firm out of the
number of opportunities a firm had to respond.
Number of responders - the total number of firms that actually respond to
an action.
Response order- rank position based on response lag.
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Response imitation - the degree to which the response imitates the action.
The response characteristics and the actor/responder characteristics are
the focus of the present study and are applicable to the research questions
addressed in the present study. Their operationalization and measurement will
be discussed separately in the methodology chapter.
Studies based on the CIP Model
The competitive interaction stream of research resulting from the
application of the CIP model is a comparatively new area of research in the
Strategic Management literature. As a result of its relative newness, there have
been a modest number of empirical studies based on the CIP model. One of the
earliest was a small-scale study based on interviews with top-level managers
from high-tech industry firms (Smith, Grimm, & Gannon, 1990).

However, the

majority of the research articles published in this field are based on the empirical
data in the U.S. airline industry which served as the basis for the pioneering
dissertation by Chen (1983) on the CIP model.
In a study of high-tech electronics firms (Smith, Grimm, Chen and
Gannon, 1989), the focus was on the response characteristic of response time,
also referred to in this research as response lag. Organizational characteristics
of the responder (i.e., responder characteristics) were tested for their association
with response time.

Some action characteristics were also tested for their

association with response time.

Response time, in turn, was tested for its

association with organizational performance, as measured by sales growth.
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The responder characteristics indentified and tested for their relationship
to response time were degree of formalization and strategic orientation (i.e.,
internal/external orientation as conceptualized by Miles and Snow, 1978).
Degree of formalization, the extent to which an orgnization’s behavior is
governed by rules and procedures, was not significantly correlated with response
time. In assessing the firm's overall strategic orientation and the association with
response time, the study found that the more externally oriented a firm, the lower
the response time to an action. Conversely, the more internally oriented a firm,
the higher its response time.
The action characteristics assessed in the study were the degree of
perceived threat of the action and the perceived radicality of the action. The
former was negatively associated with response time—the greater the threat, the
lower the reponse time. The latter was positively asociated with response time;
however, ‘radicality’ was poorly operationalized and measured in this study. The
results also indicated support for the hypothesis that response time was
negatively correlated with organizational performance.
In summation, the small-scale study of high-tech electronics firms tested
the responder characteristics and action characteristics components of the CIP
model for their influence on response time, as well as the relationship between
response time and performance.
A

series

dissertation.

of

research

The first study,

publications

stemmed

from

Chen’s

(1988)

Smith, Grimm, & Chen (1989) concentrated on

action characeristics as predictors of response lag. This study was focused on
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how competitors interact in the marketplace via the ongoing exchange of
competitive moves, with an emphasis on the action characteristics.

The action

characteristics associated with response lag were: (1) competitive impact; (2)
attack intensity; (3) implementation requirement; and (4) type of action, whether
strategic or tactical (It is interesting to note that of the 191 actions identified, 83%
were tactical, such as price cuts). Each of the characteristics were were found to
be salient predictors of response lag. From the findings regarding competitive
impact and attack intensity, the authors drew the conclusion that the degree of
threat represented in an action provided motivation to respond to an action. The
authors further concluded that the study suggested that the awareness,
motivation and capability of a potential responder determines its likelihood of
responding.
The second study published from the empirical research on the CIP model
in the U.S. airline industry focused on nonresponse and delayed response to
actions (Chen & MacMillan, 1992).
representing

This research focused on two variables

responder and action characteristics and the association with

nonresponse or delayed response. The responder characteristic variable was
defined as competitor dependence:

the extent to which a competitor relies on

the markets affected by an action.

The action characteristic studied was the

irreversibility of the competitive move.

This was assessed through the

application of a questionnaire mailed to 430 senior airline executives.

The

results of the analyses indicated that the greater the competitor dependence a
responder has with an actor, the lower the likelihood of non-response, while the
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greater the action irreversibility, the higher the likelihood of non-response. The
study also demonstrated, contrary to the prediction of the hypothesis, that
competitor dependence was positively related to response delay—the greater the
dependence, the greater the response delay. In their conclusion, these authors
posit lack of awareness as a possible determinant of non-response to an action.
The third study in this research stream relates action characeristics to
response characteristics (Chen & Miller, 1994). The visibility of an action, and
the centrality of

the attack

were positively associated with the number of

responders answering a competitive action.

The visibility of an attack

operationalized the awareness construct of the CIP model.

It was positively

associated with the number of responses elicited by an action. The centrality of
an attack captured the effect that a threatening action is expected to have in
competitive interaction-threatening actions provoke response. In this study, the
centrality of an attack was defined in the same way as competitor dependence in
the previous study.
The fourth study in the research stream began to compare how categories
of firms differ in their competitive behavior. Remaining within the domain of the
U.S. airline industry, Chen and Hambrick (1995) compared the competitive
behaviors of large and small firms observable through application of the CIP
model. Small airlines were found to have greater propensity for action than the
large firms in the study, faster action execution speed, and less action visibility.
However, small firms were less responsive to competitive attacks and responded
more slowly to actions than larger firms.

In short, the study conducted by Chen
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and Hambrick examined how the competitive behaviors of small firms differed
from larger firms.
In addition to refining the determinants and predictors of response
characteristics, the studies conducted by Chen and colleagues conclude that
awareness (of the action), motivation, and capability are attributes of the
responder that influence response characteristics (Chen & MacMillan, 1992,
Chen & Miller, 1994). The relevance of these responder characteristics is drawn
directly from communication-information processing theory as well as social
cognition (Keiser & Sproull, 1982).

According to Smith, Grimm and Chen,

(1989: p. 4 4 3 ) :" ... competitors can offer responses to a competitive move only if
they are aware of the move, are motivated to respond to the move, and if they
are capable to responding to the move.1'

If a responder is aware of a

competitor’s action, the likelihood of a response is greater than if the responder is
not aware.

If the responder is motivated to respond, implying that the upper

echelon of the responding firm interprets the information in the action either as a
threat or a significant opportunity, the response likelihood is greater than if the
firm is not motivated. Finally, the capability, in terms of assets, endowments and
strategies (Smith & Grimm, 1991) of the responding firm, also influences the
response characteristics. If the upper echelon assesses that it does not have the
capability, in terms of resources, to respond, response likelihood is lower.

If it

does choose to mount a response, the time to respond is longer, as it takes time
to acquire and deploy the resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993a; Cool &
Dierickx, 1993) underlying a specific capability (Chen, et al., 1992, 1994).
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Although they contribute to the theoretical refinement of the model, the
few empirical studies leave a gap in the investigation of the model and its
application in explaining and predicting competitive interatction among firms in an
industry. The theoretical presentation of the CIP model (Smith & Grimm, 1991)
set forth five groups of propositions regarding the determinants of response lag.
Each group of propositions, except one, has had components subjected to
empirical research in the U.S. airline industry. The untested proposition from the
theory underlying the CIP model regards the influence that homophily is
expected to have on reponse lag. Homophily represents the degree of similarity
between the actor and responder.
responder characteristic which

Homophily represents both an actor and

is explicitly discussed

in the theoretical

development of the CIP model (Smith & Grimm, 1991), but which has not
undergone empirical testing.

The proposition developed by Smith and Grimm

(1991) concerning homophily states that as similarity

between actors and

responders increases (e.g., their products or services are very similar) response
lag will decrease.
At first blush it may appear that the study reported

by Chen and

MacMillan (1992) might begin to address the issue of homophily and its expected
influence on the model.

However, competitor dependence was defined from a

responder’s perspective as the extent to which the responder relied on the
markets affected by an action.

Markets upon which a potential responder relies

can come under attack from firms that are similar to or dissimilar from the
potential responder (Porter, 1980). Therefore, the measure of the competitor
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dependence variable does not fully operationalize the homophily construct. On
the other hand, if we were to take competitor dependence as a valid
operationalization of homophily, what are we to make of the finding from Chen
and MacMillan's (1992) study which is contrary to Smith and Grimm's (1991)
proposition regarding homophily?

A more focused operationalization of

homophily could possibly result in support for the relationship proposed by Simth
and Grimm (1991). If it does not, then the role of homophily would be reduced to
zero in the CIP model.
In summation, the studies to date that utilize the CIP model as their point
of departure to explain and predict competitive behavior and competitive
interaction have not addressed the role of homophily. If homophily is central to
the model, if it represents an important construct capturing both actor and
responder characteristics, and if it is expected to have an influence on response
characteristics, it should be tested. The present study addresses the gap in the
extant literature on the CIP model by attempting to provide empirical support for
the proposition that homophily influences response lag and investigates the
influence that homohily may have on other response characteristics, such as
response likelihood and response matching.
The basis for the current study is the intersection of the theoretical
concepts of the CIP model and those of the Strategic Groups literature base.
Before presenting the rationale fo r investigating this intersection, the following
section presents and discusses the theoretical and empirical foundation of the
Strategic Groups construct.
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STRATEGIC GROUPS
Industry structure has long been posited as a constraint on competition
within an industry (Bain, 1956; Porter, 1980; Cool & Schendel, 1988; Boeker,
1991). One aspect of industry structure--the strategic group--was identified by
Hunt (1972) as groups of firms using differentiated means to compete in an
industry. Hunt found that firms within a strategic group were similar in the
strategies used to compete, and that several strategic groups could exist within a
single industry. This construct has been applied to research in both the
Industrial/Organizational

(I/O)

Economics and the

Strategic

Management

streams of research (Bogner, et al., 1994) and has been the basis for several
theoretical and empirical studies (Day, et al., 1995; Tang & Thomas, 1992).
Strategic group research has been conducted to describe the structure of a
number of industries (Day, et al., 1995).
A strategic group is a group of firms in an industry that are similar along
key strategic attributes (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990; 1993; Cool & Dierickx,
1993), having made similar decisions in key areas (Porter, 1980). Firms within a
group are more similar to one another along stated strategic dimensions than to
firms from other groups; firms from different groups are asymmetric along the
strategic dimensions of interest.

The strategic dimensions generally used to

assess symmetry/asymmetry represent product/market scope and resource
bundles (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1993). Differences in
these strategic dimensions are taken to result from upper echelon discretion in
domain selection, domain navigation, and resource allocation (Bogner, et al.,
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1994).

As such, a firm’s profile along strategic dimensions is a result of a

strategic decision-making process within the firm.
Strategic groups have been presented in the literature as having an
influence on the flow and interpretation of information among firms in an industry
(Harrigan, 1985). The outcome of this differentiated flow of information resulting
from strategic group structures is not clear from the strategic group literature.
Some indicate that this flow results in a greater opportunity for collusory behavior
(Porter 1980; 1985; Harrigan, 1985), resulting in reduced competitive interaction
between firms within groups. Others state that this flow of information and its
interpretability should result in greater levels of competitive interaction, hence
rivalry, within strategic groups (Cool & Dierickx, 1993).
Empirical research seems to confirm the existence of strategic groups
(Tang & Thomas, 1992). Strategic groups have been found to exist in several
different industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry (Cool & Schendel,
1988), the insurance industry (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990) the global
automotive industry (Nohria & Garcia-Pont,
industry (Duysters & Hagedoom, 1995).

1991) and the global computer

Day (1995), in a recent review of

strategic groups research, provides a list of 45 research articles focusing on
strategic groups in 18 different industries over the period 1972 to 1993. Several
theoretical perspectives have been used to argue the existence of groupings
within an industry.
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Theoretical Perspectives
There are four primary theoretical perspectives upon which the argument
for the existence of strategic groups has been founded.

First, groups may

develop from strategic choices made firms in their risk posture, skill development
and asset investment, with firms making similar strategic choices clustered in the
same competitive space (Cool, 1985).

Second, Caves and Porter (1979)

suggest that the emergence of group structures depends on whether firms
choose to respond to competitors’ strategic initiatives in a systematically different
manner (Tang & Thomas, 1993).

If there is a systematic difference, a group

structure emerges in the industry. In a study of 50 manufacturing industries,
Hergert, 1987, found that the number of strategic groups ranged from one (i.e.,
no systematically differential reaction to strategic initiatives) to six (i.e., at least
six different competitive positions within the industry, with differing profiles on
specific strategic initiatives including advertising, R&D ratio, and number of
customer segments served). The mode for the number of strategic groups in
Hergert’s study was four groups in 24 industries.
The third theoretical rationale for the existence of strategic groups holds
that previous investments in resources and technology may lead to the creation
of strategic groups. Firms which have made previous investments in technology
may not be able to shift to new technology due to the costs involved, creating
groupings based on available technology and the available options with which to
deploy that technology (Tang & Thomas, 1994).

Recent work by Cool and

Dierickx (1993) has focused on resource stocks and resource flows as a
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differentiating factor in strategic group evolution and argues that strategic group
membership is a function of past investments in assets.
Recently, the concept of spatial competition has been put forth as a
theoretical explanation of strategic groups. Based on the principles of minimum
differentiation (Hotelling, 1929) and local clustering (Easton & Lipsey, 1975), the
spatial competition argument proposes that product attributes of competing firms
tend to be similar. According to Tang and Thomas (1992:325),
the dimensions of product space can be viewed as the strategic
dimensions along which firms choose to compete. With this
extension, the principle of local clustering provides the theoretical
foundation for the existence of strategic group formation based
upon strategic dimensions.
Although not directly cited by Tang and Thomas, one can draw a parallel
between their theoretical justification of strategic groups and Hergert’s earlier
findings.

In industries where Hergert (1987) found only one industry-inclusive

strategic group, the influence of spatial competition and local clustering could be
argued to have been minimal.

In industries where Hergert found

multiple

groups, the influence of spatial competition and local clustering could be posited
as having been stronger.

This interpretation is consistent with the theories

developed by Hotelling (1929) and Easton and Lipsey (1975), which Tang and
Thomas applied as justification for the emergence of strategic groups in an
industry.
Another recent development in strategic group research has been the
application of cognitive taxonomy as a theoretical justification for the existence
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of strategic groups in an industry (Bogner & Thomas, 1993; Peteraf & Shanley,
1997; Porac et al, 1987; Reger & Huff , 1993). Adherents to this argument for
the existence of strategic groups suggest that cognitive taxonomies result from
the implicit classification schemes of the competitive environment used by the
upper echelon within a firm and that these schemes cluster firms into groups
according to similarities. The cognitive taxonomy provides a mental model of the
competitive environment and provides a means to “frame a conceptual structure
of [the] competitive environment in order to monitor the environment and
formulate strategy” and to focalize environmental scanning

(Tang & Thomas,

1992:326).
Bogner and Thomas (1993) suggest that this conceptual structure of the
competitive environment influences the sense-making process and strategic
choice. Cognitive classification schemes provide a summary of the competitive
environment and act as reference points for strategic choice and competition.
Because these mental models result from decision makers’ assessment of
similarity of their firm to other firms in the industry (Porac, et al, 1987; Huff &
Reger, 1992) and these mental models influence strategic choice, Tang and
Thomas (1993) propose that “mental models of competition in an industry
determine the strategic group structure of that industry, and firms in the same
group will be considered stronger competitors" (1992:327).
Bogner and Thomas (1993) synthesize the Industrial/Organization (I/O)
roots of strategic group theory with the organizational behavior (OB) origins of
cognitive taxonomy in order to develop a model which indicates that the
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economic and objective strategic groups (i.e., the I/O concept of groups as a
facet of industry structure) influence the cognitive groupings perceived by the
firms' decision makers (i.e., the OB perspective of groups as a result of an
enacted cognitive process). Enacting the perceived environment leads to actions
that serve either to reinforce or alter the strategic grouping. Thus, we observe in
an industry time periods with a stable group structure and other time periods with
change and transition to a new strategic group structure. The model developed
by Bogner and Thomas (1993) links the objective environment with the perceived
environment to explain the link between

strategic groups and

strategy

formulation.
Empirical Findings
Empirical strategic group research has focused predominantly on three
major themes: (1) the relationship between strategic groups and performance; (2)
the derivation of strategic groups; and (3) the stability of the strategic group
structure over time. Each of these will be discussed in order.
Relationship between strategic groups and performance.

This has

been a central theme in strategic group research (Cool & Schendel, 1988;
McGee & Thomas, 1986; Thomas & Venkatramen, 1989; Bogner, et al., 1994).
Within the I/O economics tradition of organizational research, the emphasis on
strategic groups has been to relate performance to group membership (Porter,
1980; Cool & Schendel, 1988). Several studies have been undertaken in this
vein, with equivocal findings. While some studies have found support for the
existence of a strategic group-performance relationship, the existence of a direct
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link between group membership and firm profitability appears questionable (Cool
& Dierickx, 1993) and the predictive validity of strategic groups in terms of
performance has been weak. The lack of agreement in findings on the predictive
validity of the strategic group construct for performance is troublesome, given the
origination of the concept in the stru ctu re

conduct

perform ance

paradigm reflecting the I/O economics influence of strategy research. The lack of
any definitive finding regarding the relationship between group membership and
performance leads one to ask if the strategic group construct has any predictive
validity on the conduct of firms within an identified grouping.
The derivation of strategic groups. This area of research has focused
on how groups in an industry are identified; the variables used as proxies for
strategic decisions (i.e., areas of firm behavior influenced by managerial choice)
representing product and market scope, and resource allocation; and the
statistical method used to determine the underlying groupings from the pattern of
product/market scope variables and resource allocation variables.

Recent

research has focused on the product/market scope and resource allocation areas
of strategy content as the basis of identifying grouping variables (Cool, 1985;
Deams & Thomas, 1994). The method predominately used to identify groups
has been cluster analysis (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990; Harrigan, 1985), though
factor analysis and multi-dimensional scaling have also been used.
Stability of the strategic group structure over time.
Schendel (1988), studying a

Cool and

20-year period in the pharmaceutical industry,

presented the first substantiation that strategic groups are a “relatively stable
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phenomena" (1988:1120).
research.

This finding was also supported by subsequent

In a study of the U.S. insurance industry Feigenbaum and Thomas

(1990) found that most firms belonged to the same strategic group over the 20year period of their study. Low firm mobility between groups was also observed
in the offshore drilling industry, with only two of 679 firms changing strategic
groupings (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989).

Consistent with previous studies,

Bogner et al. (1994) found that few firms actually change groups.
Conduct Within Strategic Groups
Few studies of strategic groups have directly addressed the issue of the
competitive patterns of firms within strategic groups.

When the concept of a

change in competitive patterns has been addressed (Cool, 1985, for example), it
has been discussed in terms of the entire group moving to different dimensions
of strategic space as defined by the product/market scope and resource
deployment variables.

Given how groups have been identified, this type of

change in competitive pattern addresses only how strategies used to compete
have changed at the group level; it does not address whether or not the group
structure influences the interaction of firms within or between groups.
Recent work in competitive interaction has only just begun to address the
potential influence that strategic groups may have on competitive action

and

response patterns (Chen & Hambrick, 1995). The study by Chen and Hambrick,
however, looked only at the impact of firm size on competitive interaction. In this
study these researchers found that smaller firms took longer to respond to the
actions of larger firms, presumably due to differences in capabilities. Although
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size has been used as a single variable to identify strategic groups in previous
studies (Porter, 1979),

scholars studying strategic groups advocate a multi

variate approach to capture the multi-dimensional nature of strategic decision
making carried out in firms regarding product/market scope, resource allocation,
and process technology (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Thomas & Venkatramen, 1989;
Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990;

Daems & Thomas, 1994; Harrigan, 1985).

Strategic group research has evolved beyond considering just size alone as
representative of strategic decisions made by the management of firms in an
industry.
While the strategic group construct has been criticized as being an
analytical artifact (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Hatten & Hatten, 1987), if it does
reflect a theoretical construct as others suggest (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1987;
1994; McGee & Thomas, 1986; Tang & Thomas, 1995), then we would expect to
see this construct bear an influence on the conduct of firms within groups.
Competitive behavior, as a manifestation of the patterns of intended or emergent
strategies arising from the upper echelon’s strategic decision process, is conduct
at the firm level (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).

It is this conduct and the

information contained therein that is being communicated to other firms in the
industry, and captured by the CIP model of competitive interaction. This firmlevel conduct may well indeed be influenced by the existence of strategic groups
in the industry.
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SUMMARY
A

newly developed

model

within

Strategic Management research

proposes that the process of competitive interaction is analogous to the
communication-information process.

The model equates components of the

communication process with components of the competitive interaction process.
A facet of the model which has undergone limited investigation is the influence
that similarity between the sender and receiver is expected to have on
competitive interaction when characterized as a communication process. This
similarity is presented in communication theory as homophily

and in the CIP

model as a characteristic of the actor, the receiver, and the competitive
environment.
The strategic group provides a valuable construct through which to
analyze and understand competitive behavior (Tang & Thomas, 1992; McGee &
Thomas, 1986; Thomas & Venkatramen, 1989). Strategic groups represent
groupings of firms that have made similar resource investments, have similar
product/market scope, and a similar conceptualization of the competitive
environment.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES

The framework provided by the CIP model presented in the previous
chapter allows the constructs of communication-information processing theory
that may result in increased or decreased interaction between entities to be
applied to the analysis of competition. From this jumping-off point, this chapter
presents the intersection of the two research streams presented in Chapter 2.
This chapter also articulates a theoretical rationale for the effect of strategic
groups within an industry on competitive interaction.
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INTERSECTION OF THE COMMUNICATION-INFORMATION
PROCESSING MODEL OF COMPETITIVE INTERACTION AND
STRATEGIC GROUPS
The CIP model allows the constructs of communication theory to be
applied to the analysis of competition.

In order to do this, constructs from

organizational and industrial research must be identified that can be used as
proxies for parallel constructs in communication-information processing theory.
This section presents the homophily construct from communication theory and
the strategic group construct from I/O Economics as parallel constructs.
As previously discussed, when an action takes place, the characteristics
of the actor and a potential responder to an action have been found to influence
the likelihood of a response, the time to respond, and other response
characteristics. The specific characteristic of both the actor and responder that is
of interest in this study is the homophily between the actor and responders. In
communication theory homophily is a characteristic that describes the similarity
between the source (the actor) and the receiver (the responder).

In their

presentation of the theoretical underpinnings of the CIP model of competitive
interaction, Smith and Grimm (1991) propose that homophily should influence the
dynamics of interaction. This construct enters the model given in Figure 2 as a
characteristic of both the sender and the receiver. Smith and Grimm (1991) state
that the proposition that more effective communication occurs when the source
and receiver are homophilous (i.e., similar) is an important one in the
communication literature. They go on to state that “the concept of homophily is
used here to describe the degree to which pairs of competitors are alike in terms
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of specific assets, unique capabilities and endowments, as well as products,
markets, and strategies" (Smith & Grimm, 1991:11). The degree of homophily
between the actor and the responder is expected to influence the communication
process and influence response characteristics.
The concept of homophily is also introduced in the model through the
competitive environment. Smith, Grimm and Gannon (1992:123) clarify this point
by stating that

"one of the key dimensions by which industries and their

structures may vary include homogeneity, or the similarity of competitors in terms
of size, resources, strategies, and costs (Aldrich, 1979; Gollop & Roberts, 1979;
Hannan & Freeman, 1977)."

The structures in the industry resulting from

homogeneity give rise to the homophily between entities within the structure.
Because the firm-level characteristic of homophily arises from the
industry-level characteristic of homogeneity, the homophily between the actor
and responder should be captured by the strategic group construct. Firms within
a strategic group share a level of interdependence, due to similarities in strategic
capabilities (Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1993) and in product and market scope
(Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Cool and Dierickx, 1993). A market has been
defined as being a tangible, inter-related set of mutually aware firms that act
based on the observed actions of others, summarized through a feedback
process (White, 1981).

Strategic group theory proposes that the industry is

structured into subsets of competitors based on similarity in product, market,
processes and customers, and that these groupings frame conduct, behavior,
decision-making and competition within the industry (Porac & Thomas, 1990;
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Porac, et al., 1994; Bogner & Thomas, 1994; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Due to
these similarities, firms within the same strategic group represent homophilous
entities within the communication framework.

The strategic group construct of

Strategic Management and I/O Economics should serve as a proxy for the
homophily construct of communication theory.
This

apparent

equivalence

between

the

homophily

concept

of

communication theory and the strategic group construct of the I/O literature base
directly addresses the primary research question of whether the existence of
strategic groups in an industry affects competitive interaction in that industry.
Homophily is proposed to influence response characteristics. The argument has
been presented that the strategic group construct is an equivalent to homophily.
Casting this assessment of strategic groups in terms of the CIP model of
competitive interaction yields the proposition that the existence of strategic
groups in an industry should influence competitive interaction and response
characteristics as operationalized through the CIP model. Due to homophily and
the resulting experience in communicating with similar entities, firms within a
strategic group may have greater expertise in dealing with one another and
therefore a greater source of accumulated knowledge in the upper echelon to
interpret the intentions of actions taken by group members (Harrigan, 1985; Heil
& Robertson, 1991).
The existence of strategic groups in an industry and a firm's membership
within a group should influence competitive interaction (Caves & Porter, 1979;
Cool & Dierickx, 1993; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). The strategic group represents
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the structure within an industry--the context within which competitive interaction
occurs (Bain, 1959; Hunt, 1972; Newman, 1973).

Inclusion of a firm in a

strategic group affects the firm’s strategic posture and constrains its freedom of
action (Pitt & Thomas, 1994).

While there is a basic understanding of what

strategic groups are, there are conflicting views on how the existence of strategic
groups affects the conduct of firms within them. For example, part of the appeal
of the strategic group construct is that it captures the intuitive notion that rivalry
differs within a group and between groups (Cool & Diereckx, 1993). This intuitive
notion, however, does not indicate if firms within groups are more intensely
competitive (i.e., exhibit greater competitive interaction) with each other than with
firms outside the group. The strategic group literature has not clearly addressed
the issue of the directionality of rivalry among firms within and between groups.
Porter (1980)

suggests that within-group

rivalry is moderate and

accommodative: firms in a group generally tolerate each other. Because of the
similarity among firms in a group, firms resemble one another closely and
recognize their mutual dependence.

Recognition of this mutual dependence

gives rise to oligopolistic behavior, limiting within-group competition and
enhancing between-group competition (Caves & Porter, 1988).

On the other

hand, Henderson (1983:8) states that "the more similar competitors are to each
other, the more severe their competition."

Since groups represent firms

homogeneous (i.e., similar) along several strategic dimensions, the inference is
that competition (i.e., rivalry) is stronger between firms in the same group, than
between firms from different groups.
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The recognition of mutual interdependence within groups is proposed to
influence the flow of communication within the group (Harrigan, 1985). Heil and
Robertson (1991) emphasize the influence of similarity on competition, noting
that competitors which are similar in their strategies and structures monitor each
other most closely and are most able to interpret competitive signals.

Pitt and

Thomas (1994:85) state that, because groups represent structure, "firms in a
group share a common set of products, technologies, customers, and distribution
channels, yielding a zero-sum game competition and, thus, intense within-group
rivalry." The question of the directionality of rivalry represents, in part, the nature
of competitive interaction within an industry.
The lack of a clear perspective on rivalry within and between groups is
also evidenced with regard to strategic distance. Cool and Diereckx (1993) build
an argument that between-group rivalry is greater than within-group rivalry. This
position on rivalry is also based on the proposition that group members recognize
their mutual interdependence, an argument couched in the expected oligopolistic
behavior of firms within groups (Porter, 1980).

However, Cool and Diereckx

(1993) draw upon the same literature base to suggest that increasing strategic
distance, operationalized as decreasing similarity,
competition between strategic groups" (1993:49).

“would lead to more
However, Hergert (1987)

found statistically weak support for the opposite of Cool and Dierickx's
proposition: as strategic distance decreased,

between-group rivalry increased.

Caves and Porter (1977) and Porter (1976, 1979) put forth the argument that
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interaction is greater inter-group than intra-group, a position which even Porter
(1980) later reverses.
Aside from being the results of aggregate strategic and economic
decisions (Bogner & Thomas, 1993), strategic groups represent a cognitive
framework that competitors apply to their environment (Porac & Thomas, 1990;
Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Reger & Huff, 1993).

This cognitive

framework provides a cognitive schema for perceiving and understanding the
competitive environment, assessing cues, and comparing conduct (Feigenbaum,
Hart & Schendel, 1993). The perceptions of strategic group structure are widely
shared by industry participants (Reger & Huff, 1993; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997).
The existence of stable strategic groups over a period of time gives rise to
institutional forces (Dimaggio &Powell, 1983) that serve to forge a strategic group
identity of firms within groups (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Accordingly, strategic
groups are manifestations of the ways in which strategists organize and interpret
their environment.

As such, they are structures which should influence the

enactment processes (Weick, 1979) that strategists use in making decisions to
guide their firms and navigate the competitive domain.
At the firm level, theories of inter-firm competition agree that the greater
the degree of overlap between a firm's market domain and that of others, the
greater the intensity of competition the focal firm experiences (Hannan &
Freeman, 1977; Porter, 1980; Scherer & Ross, 1990).

Research directly

examining the patterns of rivalry between firms within and across strategic
groups is limited (Barnett, 1993; Cool & Dierickx, 1993; Peteraf, 1994). However,
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if one considers the determinants

of competitive response

(awareness,

capabilities, and motivation) as presented in the Communication-lnformation
Processing Model of Competitive Interaction, one might deduce that the
existence of a group structure would influence competitive interaction to be
greater within groups than between groups.

The question of whether the

existence of strategic groupings influence which firms interact more stronglyfirms within

groups or firms across

groups-remains a fertile

area for

investigation.
The emphasis in the literature placed on the similarity of firms within
strategic groups and the dissimilarity of firms across strategic groups addresses
the role homophily is expected to have in the CIP model of competitive
interaction previously discussed. The stability of groups over time indicates that
the homophily of firms in a group provides a long-term context within which to
interpret signals and frame strategic decision cycles.

Firms within these

symmetric, homophilous groupings should have similar resource capabilities
(Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991), an awareness of firms within their own groupings
(Porac, et al. 1994; Spender, 1988), experience in interpreting signals from firms
in their own grouping (Porter, 1980; Harrigan, 1985), and a motivation to respond
quickly to firms within their own grouping, due to the similarities of resource and
market scope (Chen, 1996).

Chen and colleagues (Chen & MacMillan, 1992;

Chen & Miller, 1994) concluded that the factors of awareness, capabilities and
motivation would be expected to influence the response characteristics of
response lag, likelihood of response, response imitation, and the number of
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responders. Although not explicitly stated in the theoretical development of the
CIP model, it can be deduced that homophily influences response characteristics
through its influence on awareness, motivation and capability.

As a parallel

construct, the strategic group should also affect response characteristics through
the same avenues; Figure 4 outlines these relationships.
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Figure 4
Relationship of Homophily, Strategic Group Membership and Response Characteristics
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CAPABILITIES, AWARENESS AND MOTIVATION
IN STRATEGIC GROUPS
The model of competitive interaction emphasizes the role that capabilities,
awareness and motivation have in shaping the response dynamics between
firms.

Strategic group theory emphasizes the similarity in capabilities among

firms in strategic groups, the level of mutual awareness, and the motivation that
firms may have to engage in rivalrous behavior. The following section discusses
the theory and empirical findings of strategic group research in the areas of
capabilities,

awareness

and

motivation,

leading to the

development

of

hypotheses regarding how the concept of strategic groups may influence
competitive interaction and response dynamics through the construct's influence
on capabilities, awareness, and motivation.
Capabilities
Strategic group theory hypothesizes that firms are homogeneous within
strategic groups and heterogeneous between groups. This homogeneity implies
a similarity of capabilities among firms within a strategic group (Noria & GarciaPont, 1991). Movement from one group to another group is described as being
constrained by the presence of mobility barriers and by past resource
investment/allocation decisions made by the firm. These investment allocation
decisions give rise to capabilities (Ghemawatt, 1990; Barney, 1991).
Mobility barriers are structural factors that protect successful firms from
invasions by adjacent competitors, delineate boundaries between strategic
groups (Caves & Porter, 1977; Harrigan, 1985), and impede firms from freely
changing their competitive position (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). Viewed as a
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within-industry analogue to entry and exit barriers, mobility barriers inhibit
incursion from outside firms. They make entry into a strategic group costly, due
to the different strategic profiles and resource endowments upon which
competition in the group is based and the investments made to erect these
barriers (Caves & Porter, 1979).
Cool and Schendel (1987) suggest that mobility barriers contribute to the
observed stability in the configuration of strategic groups in an industry. Due to
mobility barriers, the same firms are incumbents of the same group for an
extended period of time. The stability of group membership ranged from five to
seven years in their 20-year study of the pharmaceutical industry.

Mobility

barriers deter movement between groups because of substantial cost, significant
lapse of time for a firm to alter its strategic profile, or uncertainty about outcomes
(McGee & Thomas, 1986).
Mascarenhas and Aaker (1989) propose that mobility barriers are derived
from skills and assets-again an implication of the differing capabilities between
groupings of firms.

Firms in group A are separated from firms in group B by

different skills and assets, or capabilities. If a firm would like to enter a strategic
group the “key consideration usually is whether the necessary skills and assets
exist or can be developed" (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989:476). Skills and assets
represent the resources upon which capabilities are based (Barney, 1991).
Thus, firms from one group may not have the necessary skills or assets to
compete (i.e., respond to an action) with a firm from another strategic group. If
they do respond, the response may be delayed due to the time required to
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develop the capabilities (i.e., acquire or develop the skills and assets)
neccessary to respond to an action.
Past resource investment and allocation decisions yield groupings of firms
which are similar in resource bundles within groups, yet dissimilar in resource
bundles across groups (Cool, Diereckx & Marten, 1994).

Prior investment

decisions undertaken by firms affect the range of decisions that can be
undertaken to meet challenges and threats facing the firm (Ghemawat, 1990).
Past investment limits present resources to bring to play in current competitive
situations. Since firms derive their capabilities from their resources, according to
the resource-based view of competitive strategy (Barney, 1991), a firm’s
resource profile should affect its capabilities in responding to an action. It should
be expected that firms would respond differentially to actions initiated from within
the group than to those actions initiated outside the group, as differences in
capabilities differentiate among responders to actions (Chen & MacMillan, 1992;
Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992). This presentation on capabilities suggests that
capabilities are similar within group.

It also suggests that differences in

capabilities between groups may make it more difficult for firms to respond to out
group actions, while facilitating the interpretation of an action and the response to
an in-group firm. Therefore, the strategic group should have an influence on the
response characteristics of the CIP model, due to its expected influence on
capabilities.
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Awareness
The first step in the formulation of competitive strategy is the identification
of the firm’s major competitors (Porter, 1980). The definitional issue of identifying
competitors revolves around interpreting cues from the competitive environment.
Porac and Thomas

(1990) suggest that cue interpretation involves an

assessment about the technological similarity and/or product/market similarity.
This reference to ‘similarity’ along product/market dimensions suggests that firms
within the same strategic grouping should be more aware of the competitive cues
of group member firms than of firms from other groups (Heil & Robertson, 1990).
In the assessment of the competitive environment, the information
selected, interpreted and analyzed by decision makers may be influenced by
biases--blind spots--"where a competitor will either not see (i.e., be aware of) the
significance of events . . . will perceive them incorrectly, or will perceive them
slowly" (Porter, 1980:59). These biases result from structural factors (Zajac &
Bazerman, 1991) such as firms not competing in the same strategic space due to
difference in product scope, market scope, resource asymmetries, or from the
cognitive schema the decision makers apply to make sense of the competitive
environment (Porac, Thomas & Emme, 1994; Porac & Thomas, 1993).
Huff and Reger (1993) suggest that strategists within an organization
readily perceive strategic groups within their industry. They further contend that
these groups provide a means of organizing and making sense of their
competitive environment. Caves and Porter (1977) state that firms in a strategic
group are aware of their mutual interdependence.

Research conducted by
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Feigenbaum and Thomas (1990) suggests that firms in the same strategic
groups are more aware of the actions and behaviors of groups members than
non-group members and focus on the behaviors of firms within the same
strategic group when making competitive strategy decisions. These researchers
have confirmed that the strategic group acts as a reference group. Members use
the groups as normative and comparative benchmarks and adjust strategic
behavior accordingly. This suggests that firms within groups have a higher level
of awareness of each other than of firms in different groups. In terms of the CIP
model, firms in the same group should be more aware of actions taken by group
members than of actions taken by outside, non-group member firms.

This

awareness influences the observed response characteristics to competitive
actions (Chen, et al., 1994).
The influence of strategic groups on the decision makers' cognitive
understanding of their competitive environments is further discussed by Bogner
and Thomas (1993). They suggest that objective strategic groupings drive the
cognitive strategic groupings that decision makers form of their industry and their
place in it.
influences

During periods of group stability, the objective structural context
decision

makers'

cognitive

assessments

of

the

competitive

environment. Because of these cognitive assessments, decision makers, during
period of group stability, may be more aware of the actions of and interactions
among firms in their own group. Hence, it is these cues from within the group
that are noticed, interpreted for meaning, and acted upon (Porac, et al., 1994;
Heil and Robertson, 1991).
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Firms within a strategic group should be more likely to be aware of actions
taken by other group members and respond to those actions. Evidence suggests
that actors acknowledge, at least implicitly, their firm’s membership in groups;
this appears to constrain firms’ future conduct (Cool, 1985; Cool & Schendel,
1988; Harrigan, 1985). Due to cognitive simplification (Schwenk, 1980), decision
makers will be more aware of the actions of the firms that are recognized as
similar, and act accordingly (Reger & Huff, 1993). Porter (1980) has suggested
that firms in the same strategic group should recognize (i.e., be aware of) each
other as close competitors and that firms in different strategic groups are less
closely competitive. It should be expected that firms would respond differentially
to actions initiated from within the group than those actions initiated outside the
group due to the hypothesized influence that strategic group membership has on
a firm’s attention to and awareness of actions of other firms in the same strategic
group.
Motivation
Firms undertake actions to capitalize on an opportunity, or minimize a
threat to their competitive position.

Firms may be prompted to respond to the

actions of others by the observation that the latter have higher performance
levels in terms of market dominance (Cool & Schendel, 1988). Performance is
based on the competitive advantage of the firm, with the strategic capabilities of
the firm being the fundamental source of competitive advantage (Teece, 1988).
Each strategic group has a distinctive source of competitive advantage that
cannot be easily acquired or imitated by firms in other groups (Nohria & Garcia-
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Pont, 1991).

Because competitive advantage is a factor contributing to

performance, firms are motivated to protect their sources of advantage (Petraf,
1990).

An action taken by a group-member firm that utilizes a resource or

capability in a manner which returns greater rents is a direct threat to other firms
in the same group, and those firms would be motivated to respond to share in the
gains anticipated from an action (Feigenbaum & Thomas; 1990).
Motivation to respond to actions of group-member firms also arises from
the product/market scope similarities within groups (Chen, 1996).

An action

taken on either the product or market dimension could be interpreted as a threat
to the positions of other firms within the group. The likelihood of response is
greater under conditions of perceived threat (Chen & MacMillan, 1992).

The

actions taken by a group-member firm may be more readily interpreted as a
threat than the actions taken by a non-group-member firm (Porac, et al. 1994;
Harrigan, 1985; Heil & Robertson, 1991). It should be expected that firms would
respond differentially to actions initiated from within the group than those actions
initiated outside the group due to the hypothesized influence that strategic group
membership has on a firm’s motivation to reap rents from its resource
investments and to protect its product/market scope position within the group.
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EFFECTS OF STRATEGIC GROUPS
Response Likelihood and Lag
From strategic group theory a rationale can be deduced about the
construct's influence on the capabilities of firms within groups and the difference
in capabilities across groups.

A rationale can also be deduced regarding the

potential for a greater awareness of firms within groups to actions from groupmember firms than from those firms outside the group; and also about the level
of motivation to utilize and protect competitive advantage and product/market
position. The strategic group literature base provides the theoretical foundation
to deduce that strategic groups frame the responder's awareness of an action, its
assessment of its capabilities and its motivation to respond.

Based on the

strategic group’s framing of awareness, capability, and motivation, and the
influence of these three constructs on a responder’s response characteristics, it
is hypothesized that the presence of strategic groups in an industry will influence
competitive interaction and response characteristics. Thus,
H1:

Firms will respond with a higher frequency-have a higher response
likelihood— to actions originating within a strategic group than to
actions originating from outside a strategic group.

H2:

Response lag will be greater to actions originating outside of the
responding firm’s strategic group; response lag will be lower for
actions originating inside the responding firm's strategic group.

Also, the discussion on mobility barriers as presented above suggests the
influence that strategic groups may have on awareness, capabilities and
motivation is incremental, hence,
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H3:

The response lag to an action will vary with the height of the
mobility barriers between groups.

Imitation
The strategic group literature also provides a basis to predict the degree to
which firm s’ responses will mimic, or imitate, an action. Mobility barriers protect
firms from imitation from firms outside the group (Mascarenhas, 1989; Bogner, et
al., 1994). The similarity of strategic capabilities within group provides the basis
for an interpretation of the expected benefits to be gained from an action, and
how similar capabilities can be utilized to appropriate those benefits. From the
work of Feigenbaum and Thomas (1990) as well as from Porac, et al. (1994), the
group can be interpreted as providing some institutional forces that influence the
behaviors of decision makers and the resultant actions taken by the firm.
Institutional theory (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983), then, would be expected to have
an influence over the competitive interaction within and between groups.
Therefore, imitative responses should be greater within group and lessen as the
strategic distance from the acting firm increases. That is, if a firm in a different
strategic group is responded to, strategic group and institutional theory would
predict that the response does not match (i.e., imitate) the original action. This
line of reasoning yield the following hypothesis:
H4:

Response imitation will occur with greater frequency to actions
within a group than to actions which originate outside of a group.
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Response Order
Chen and Hambrick (1995) identified a response hierarchy based on firm
size.

Larger firms responded sooner to actions than did smaller firms.

The

question from a strategic group perspective is whether a response hierarchy
exists within group.
actions?

Is a specific response order identifiable to within-group

From the I/O literature on strategic groups, the group is seen as a

means to coordinate the activities within the group (Harrigan, 1985; Petraf,
1993), although this has not been empirically investigated.

If there were a

"pecking order” within groups, then we would expect to see a consistent
response hierarchy.

From multiple action events within a group, it should be

possible to determine if the response order within group is consistent from action
to action. Therefore,
H5:

Firms within a strategic group will exhibit a consistent response
hierarchy, based on response order, to within-group actions.
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SUMMARY
The proposition was developed in this chapter that homophily and the
strategic group are analogous constructs from two different research streams
and that the strategic group should serve as a proxy for the homophily construct
in the application of the CIP model. This chapter went on to present hypotheses
developed from the intersection of strategic group theory and the CIP model of
competitive interaction.
Firms in a strategic group are, in the terms of communication theory,
homophilous—similar in characteristics.

The existence of strategic groupings

within an industry and the membership of a firm to a specific strategic grouping
should have an influence on the competitive conduct of the firm within the
industry and the strategic group.

The influence of the strategic group on

competitive conduct shculd, in turn, manifest itself in terms of the competitive
response characteristics of the communication-information processing model of
competitive interaction.
The proposition from the CIP model on the expected role of homophily in
competitive interaction, the argument for strategic groupings resulting from a
cognitive taxonomy of the competitive environment as well as similarity in
resource investments, and the finding that strategic groups are stable over a
period of time suggests that this study’s premise is supported by theoretical
grounding in the literature of the two research streams discussed in this chapter.
The constructs within the strategic group literature have been presented
and an argument about how these may contribute to the awareness, capabilities
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and motivation determinants of competitive response has been proposed. These
determinants of competitive response are then used to predict the response
characteristics to actions arising within a strategic group and how these
dynamics compare to actions arising from other strategic groups.

Table 1

presents a summary of the hypotheses and the dependent and independent
variables contained in these hypotheses.
Through the application of the strategic group construct to the CIP model
of competitive interaction, the current study should shed light on the influence
that strategic groups may have on competitive response characteristics among
firms in a focal industry.
Chapter 4 presents the discussion of the methodology for this study, the
measures for the dependent and independent variables, and the focal industry
within which strategic groups were identified.
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Table 1
List of Hypotheses and Variables
Statement__________ Pep. Variable
Hypothesis 1 RLK to outside-group
Frequency of
actions < RLK to within
Response to
group actions
an in-group v.
out-group
action
Where RLK = Response
likelihood of firms
responding to an action,
measured as frequency of
responses to in-group v.
out-group actions
Hypothesis 2 RL to outside-group
actions >
RL to within group
actions

Hypothesis 3 RL = f(mobiiity barrier
height)
Response Lag is a function
of the height of the mobility
barriers between the actors
strategic group and the
responder’s strategic
groups. The greater this
distance, the greater the
response lag
Hypothesis 4 RM(Aig) > RM (Aog)
Among responding firms,
Response imitation will be
greater to in-group actions
than to out-group actions .

Hypothesis 5 A consistent response
order is observable within
groups.

Indep. Variable
Similarity of
Actor and
Responder
characteristic as
measured by
group
membership

RL =
Response Lag
to an action
(RL=time in
days from
initial action to
response)

Similarity of
Actor &
Responder
characteristic as
captured by
strategic group
membership

RL =
Response Lag
(Time in days
from initial
action to
response)

Mobility barrier
height between
the acting firm’s
group and the
responding
firms' groups
(Euclidean
distance
between
groups)
Strategic group
membership of
Actor,
Responder

RM =
Response
Imitation
(Match
between
action and
response)
Rank order of
respondents
based on RL

Competitive
events in-group
(Action,
Responses)
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methodology to be used in this study and is
organized into the following sections: (1) sample selection; (2) overall research
procedure; (3) identification and measurement of dependent and independent
variables; and (4) discussion of the statistical analyses used to test the
hypotheses.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62

SAMPLE SELECTION
The focal industry for this study is the U.S. steel industry.

Data on

competitive actions and responses were collected for firms represented in this
industry. The U.S. steel industry was chosen because it was expected to yield a
high incidence of competitive events.

It is an industry that has been

characterized as being in “decline” (Hogan, 1980) and with high exit barriers,
making it conducive to high levels of competition (Harrigan, 1980). Selection of
this industry expands the domain of previous work on competitive interaction
along several dimensions. First, this study attempts to apply the findings derived
from a service-based, consumer-related industry (the U.S. airline industry) to a
manufacturing, producer-goods industry.

Second, competitive members of the

steel industry include international firms operating within the U.S. market. There
have been recent calls for internationalization within strategic group studies
(Hagedoom, 1995).

The issue of internationalization has been addressed by

selecting an industry that is global in nature (Roth, 1987). The steel industry is
subject to global competition as determined by: (1) the amount of intra-industry
trade at world and domestic (U.S.) market levels; and (2) the large number of
non-U.S. firms ranked among the top ten producers in the global industry.
Steel producing firms operating in the U.S. from Asia (Japan, Korea),
North America (Canada, U.S.) and the European Union (member countries as of
1990) were included in the study. These geographic regions have been selected
because: (1) they are historically important in the world steel market-most of the
world’s largest producers are in these areas; and (2) they coincide with the
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location of major industrial countries--steel consumption is linked to industrial
consumption.
The firms chosen were U.S. and foreign firms operating in the U.S. steel
market identified from the Worldscope/Compact Disclosure database.

Firms

were selected on the basis of SIC code: 3310 (Iron and Steel Manufacturing).
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RESEARCH PROCEDURE
With the focal industry for the study identified, the research procedure
requires:

(1) identification of strategic groupings within the industry, and (2)

identification of competitive actions and responses occurring within the industry.
Identification of Strategic Groups
Data

for

forming

strategic

groups

was

taken

from

Compact

Disclosure/WoridScope, Compustat, and the Directory o f Iron and Steel Plants.
The former two databases were chosen because of the selection and availability
of data on publicly traded companies; the latter source was selected because it
presents annual data on integrated, mini-mill and foreign steel producers on a
number of industry-related variables.

Data on industry-related variables is

necessary to identify the strategic groups.
Several different grouping procedures have been applied in the research
focusing on strategic groups. Porter (1980), for instance, focused on size as a
grouping variable. Harrigan (1985) applied a clustering algorithm to strategically
significant industry variables, as did Feignebaum and Thomas (1990).

These

methods of group identification can be classified as objective methods, as they
use archival, firm-level data to derive groups. Others, such as Huff and Reger
(1993) and Porac and Thomas (1994), have taken a subjective, more cognitively
derived, approach towards the identification of groups.

This method requires

significant input from individuals within the firm. These individuals are usually
from the upper echelon and are interviewed or surveyed. This information is then
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used to identify the cognitive schema that decision makers apply to their
competitive environments. Those firms that have similar views of the competitive
environment are classified in the same strategic group.
The choice of grouping method in strategic group research is influenced
by the type of research being done (Thomas & Venkatramen, 1989).
scale, empirical studies apply objective methods to derive groups.

LargeThis is

generally because these studies involve a large number of firms, or a long
period. For these types of studies, the subjective method may be perceived as
being too onerous (Reger & Huff, 1993), or there may be a potential for decision
makers to

revise

historical

perceptions.

Subjective

methods

of group

identification are more generally used in studies that focus specifically on group
identification, a small number of firms, or when the required research data is
perceptual-based on firms' key informants-and in the same time frame as when
the groups are derived (Daems & Thomas, 1994).
The nature of the present study fits the type to which objective methods of
strategic group identification are applied.

Cluster analysis is the most widely

applied objective grouping method (Harrigan, 1985; Feigenbaum & Thomas,
1990; Bogner & Thomas, 1993), and was chosen for this study. Cluster analysis
is a multivariate statistical procedure that starts with a data set of information
about a sample of entities and

reorganizes the entities

into

relatively

homogeneous groups (Aldenserfer & Blashfield, 1984).
The cluster method for forming strategic groups is not without criticism.
Barney and Hoskisson (1990) question the validity of the procedure to derive
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consistent groupings. Hatten and Hatten (1987) indicate that the appearance of
strategic groups may be an artifact of methodology. These issues appear to be
rebutted, however, by the findings of temporal consistency in the structure of
strategic groups in an industry over time (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1990)
Cluster analysis for group classification requires the specification of the
grouping variables and the analysis of the data to identify the group structure.
The selected variables tap firm attributes that reflect the product/market scope
and strategic resource dimensions, which are central concepts of the strategic
group literature base. The selected attribute variables for this study also reflect
product/market scope and resource dimensions.

An extensive review of the

strategic group literature and steel products and manufacturing literature
provided a basis for the firm-level variables selected to use for the identification
of strategic groups. These variables are given in Table 2.
Table 2
Resource and Product Variables Used in Group Clustering Algorithm
Resource/Capability Variables
Basic Oxygen Furnace
-number
-capacity
Electric Arc Furnace
-number
-capacity
Average Heat Size
Blast Furnace
-number
-capacity
Mill Types

Product
Variables
Sheet
Strip
Blooms
Billets
Slabs
Plate
Bars
Shapes
Rails
Oil Country Goods
Pipe & Tubing
Blackplate
Tinplate
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The resource/capability variables identified above represent how the
company manufactures steel.

Ghemawat (1990) characterizes these types of

resources as strategic assets. Cool and Diereckx (1994) apply the term resource
stocks—what the firm has to work with--to these types of firm-level attributes.
These strategic assets, or resource stocks, are utilized by the firm to
manufacture their product lines. The capabilities of a firm, and its competitive
advantage arise, in part, from these strategic assets (Barney, 1991).

The

product variables identified above represent the different products that a
company produces for the market.
Cluster analysis was used to assess the similarity between firms in the
focal industry on key firm attributes listed in Table 2 (Sharma, 1996). There are
two general types of cluster analysis techniques: hierarchical and nonhierarchical.

The former is used when the underlying group structure is not

known; the latter is applied when the number of clusters is known a priori.
Hergert (1987) analyzed 45 industries and found that the number of groups in an
industry ranged from two to six, with a mode of four. However, the steel industry
was not included in Hergert's study; therefore, we have no a priori basis for
seeding the clusters as required for the non-hierarchical technique.

The

hierarchical technique of cluster analysis was, therefore, chosen for use in this
study.
Within the hierarchical clustering technique, an algorithm must be applied
to compute distances between two clusters (Sharma, 1996).

Because the

interest in this study is in maximizing in-group similarity, consistent with the
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homophily construct, a method that achieves this objective was chosen: Ward's
linkage method. Ward’s method was used to identify groupings of firms along
similar product and resource attributes identified in Table 2. A calculation of the
Euclidean distance between groups is part of the data that results from the
application of the clustering method. The closer the Euclidean distance between
groups, the more closer the strategic groups are in terms of product/scope and
resource/capability attributes.

The greater the Euclidean distance, the further

apart groups are on the selected attributes.

Ward’s linkage method forms

clusters by maximizing similarity within group and dissimilarity between groups.
This clustering method yields groupings of firms homophilous (i.e., similar) on the
set of characteristics analyzed, a condition discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 that
was expected to have an influence on the competitive interaction among firms in
an industry.
Identification of Competitive Actions and Responses.
To be consistent with previous research and increase the possibility for
cross-study comparison the definitions and operationalization of the action and
response variables follow those of Chen and colleagues (1988, 1990-1996).
Chen (1988:111) gives the definition of a competitive action as:
a specific market move, e.g., a price cut, a market expansion, a
special promotion campaign, etc., initiated by a firm in an effort to
create a potentially stronger market position vis-a-vis its
competitor(s).
A response is defined as "a market move, taken by a competing firm in the
industry to counteract an initial competitive action" (Chen, 1988:111).
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The methodology used to collect the data on actions and responses within
the focal industry is structured content analysis. This method of content analysis
was introduced and applied by Jauch, Osbom and Martin (1980) in a comparison
of data included in case studies, and was applied by Chen (1988) in the study of
competitive interaction in the U.S. airline industry. The data used in structured
content analysis is from archival sources, such as case studies, journals,
newspapers or trade publications. The application of this technique requires the
development of a pre-designed, structured coding sheet to collect data on the
variables of interest, in this case the actors, action-type, responders, responselag.
Data were collected in this manner for actions and responses, consistent
with the definitions stated above.

Previous application of this technique was

done with a single rater to collect the indicated data on actions and responses.
Because both action-type and response imitation are binary variables (price/non
price; match/non-match) which must be identifiable from the entry in the archival
source, the judgement was made that a single rater was justifiable for the
purposes of this study.
Data on actions and responses in the steel industry cover the period from
1991 to 1993 and were obtained from the American Metal Market (AMM). This
period was chosen because it represents a stable period in demand.

In 1994

through 1997, demand for steel in the U.S. market increased. In order to control
for the potential effects of changing demand levels on competitive interaction, a
stable period was chosen, as periods of decline or increased demand may alter
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competitive behaviors in an industry (Harrigan, 1980).

The AMM is a daily

publication that covers the metal industry, including steel, in the United States.
AMM provides news and coverage of items of interest to the decision makers of
firms in this industry and is widely read by them, thus meeting the nominal criteria
established by Chen (1988) for the selection of archival data source for use in the
conduct of this type of inquiry.
Reported incidences that meet the definition of “action” or “response” were
coded for the following items: firm name; response/action type; if response, the
action type responded to; strategic group of the actor and responder; the date of
the response; and the date of the initial action; and whether or not the response
was a match to the action. These definitions and operationalizations are given in
Table 3.
Statistical Analyses
The statistical tests applied to the tests of hypotheses include chi-square,
and linear regression.

Each hypothesis discussed in Chapter 3 is presented

below with a discussion of the associated test and an initial interpretation of the
hypothesis if the test indicates that the hypothesis is rejected, or the statistical
evidence fails to reject the hypothesis.
The first hypothesis essentially states that there is an expected
association between the group membership of the actor, the group membership
of the responder, and the frequency of response to actions. A higher frequency
of response is expected to be made to actions initiated by group members than
to actions arising from outside a responder’s group. The independent variable is
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Table 3
Definition and Operationalization of Study Variables
I

Definition of Variable

Operationalization of Variable

Action

A move announced by a company in the steel
industry, as reported in American Metal Market.

Response

A countermove announced by a steel company, to a
specific action or actor, as reported in AMM.

Action type

Coded to capture the nature of the action.
P=price actions, such as increases or decreases.
NP= non-price actions, such as market expansion or
contraction or placement of the action within the acting
firm’s value chain.

Response type

Coded to capture the nature of the response.
P=price responses, such as increases or decreases.
NP=non-price responses, such as market expansion
or contraction.

Response imitation
(Dependent Variable)

Match between action type and response type.
Discerned from the information contained on both
action and response in the AMM (match=1,
nomatch=0).

Response lag
(Dependent Variable)

The time in days between the action and the
response.

Response likelihood
(Dependent Variable)

Frequency count of the responses made by a firm to
in-group actions (Ri) and frequency count of the
responses made by a firm to out-group actions (Ro).

Group membership
(Independent Variable)

Indicates if responder and actor are from the same
strategic group (same=1; notsame=0). For a
response, the group membership of the responding
firm is checked against the group membership of the
acting firm.
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the similarity of group membership between the actor and responder. This is a
nominal variable. The dependent variable is the frequency count of responses
when actor/responder are from the same group, and when actor/responder are
from different groups. Because we are observing frequencies of response and
these frequencies are expected to be associated with similarity of group
membership between actor and responder, a chi-square test of association is
applicable to test this hypothesis. This hypothesis was tested using a chi-square
test on the observed frequency of in-group and out-group responses to actions.
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference in the observed responses
(frequency of responses) and the expected responses between “in-group” and
“out-group” categories. If the chi-square test is significant there is an association
between frequency of response and similarity of group membership between
actor/responder. The association indicates that there is a difference in response
likelihood and hypothesis 1 would be supported.
Hypothesis 2 states an expectation that response lag will be greater to
actions originating outside the

responder's

group than from

within

the

responder's group. The difference of means test (t-test) is applicable here. The
observations of actions and responses represent the "population" of actions and
responses during the period.

Response Lag, the dependent variable, is an

interval variable, as it is measured in number of days from action to response.
As with Hypothesis 1 the independent variable is the similarity of group
membership between the actor and responder. This is a nominal, or categorical,
variable.

The null hypothesis here is that there is no difference in mean
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response lag to actions originating in-group or out-group.

A significant test

statistic would lead one to conclude that there is a difference in mean response
lag to actions originating in-group v. out-group.
The third hypothesis regarding the expected relationship between
response lag and mobility barriers was tested using simple linear regression
given by the equation RL = xMOBAR + e; where x is the beta value and e is the
error term.

Response lag (RL), the dependent variable, is a discrete, interval

variable, measuring the time in days between the action and the response. The
height of the mobility barrier (MOBAR) is the independent variable.

It is

measured by the group centroid distance, which is given by the Euclidean
distance between clusters of firms obtained from the clustering algorithm
(Harrigan, 1985). MOBAR is a continuous variable that ranges from null to the
numeric quantity of the greatest Euclidean distance between groups.
The fourth hypothesis stated that response imitation is expected to occur
with greater frequency to actions originating within a strategic group than to
actions from outside the group.

Similarity of group membership between the

actor and responder is the independent variable and response imitation is the
dependent variable. Both are categorical, or nominal, variables.

Similarity of

group membership between the actor and responder is expected to influence the
frequency of response imitation (match, no-match). Here, as with Hypothesis 1,
a chi-square test on the observed vs. expected frequency of response imitation
over the two conditions (in-group response imitation, out-group response
imitation) is a valid test.
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The last hypothesis states that a response hierarchy, based on response
order to an initiating action, is expected to exist with groupings of firms. This
hypothesis required identifying response order patterns to within-group actions.
Groups with multiple actions occurring within them were identified, and the
ranking of response order for each within-group competitive action was identified.
The within group ranking pattern was compared for each action event within
group. The Friedman test for comparison of rank order data was applied. This
non-parametric test identifies the ranking of frequencies in blocks as influenced
by treatments. In this case, the blocks are the ith responding firm in Group n, the
treatment is the competitive event, and the ranking is the /th firm's ranking in
response lag (response order).
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SUMMARY
This chapter presented the U.S. steel industry as the focal industry to
which the CIP model of competitive interaction was applied to determine if the
strategic group construct bears an influence on the response characteristics of
the model. The methodology for data collection (structured content analysis), the
sources of data, and the method for identifying strategic groups (cluster analysis)
were described. The next chapter presents the results of the data analysis and
the tests of hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS

This chapter presents the empirical results of the strategic groupings of
firms in the U.S. steel industry and the tests of the hypotheses identified in
Chapter 3, according to the methodology discussed in Chapter 4. The chapter is
organized into the following sections:

(1) the identification of the firms within

strategic groups and the presentation of the Euclidean distance between groups;
(2) the categorization of the competitive actions identified; (3) and the empirical
tests of Hypotheses 1 through 5.
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IDENTIFICATION OF STRATEGIC GROUPS
Identification o f Firms and Groups
U.S. and foreign firms operating in the steel industry were identified from
the Worldscope/Compact Disclosure database. Firms were selected based on
SIC code. Firms with an SIC code of 3310 (Iron and Steel Manufacturing) were
initially identified, yielding 108 firms. Firms that were not in Asia, North America,
or Europe were eliminated from further inclusion in the study. Therefore, firms
such as Iscor (South Africa) and Grupo Sidek (Mexico) were not included in the
study, nor were any Latin American firms, resulting in 49 firms eliminated from
further study.
Jacobson:

The exclusion of firms from these regions was suggested by

“Industrialized countries and the Western World have greater

apparent steel consumption than developing countries, the former USSR/Eastern
Europe, China, and other Centrally planned economies" (p.26, 1993). Data on
the steel industry indicate that both production and consumption of steel products
was higher in the U.S., Europe, and Asia, as compared to Latin America, Mexico,
Africa, and other developing nations.
The next screen to determine which firms to include in forming strategic
groups was the availability of data on key product/market attributes and
production capacity. Data on these attributes (see Table 2) were collected from
the Directory of Iron and Steel Plants (1992, 1993, and 1994). Data for 21 U.S.
firms were available on each of the attributes. Four U.S. firms were excluded at
this juncture. These four firms were either not listed in the Directory, or their data
were too incomplete for inclusion in the subsequent cluster analysis. Sixteen
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foreign firms were listed in the Directory.

The 37 firms remaining from the

screens and utilized in the cluster analysis to form firm groupings are given in
Table 4.
Table 4
Sample Firms
Company

Country

Company

Country

Acme

US

Laclede

US

Bethlehem Steel

US

British Steel

UK

Algoma Steel

Canada

Broken Hill

Australia

Dofasco Steel

Canada

China Steel

Taiwan

Geneva Steel

US

Cockerill-Sambre

Belgium

Inland Steel

US

Hoesch

German

LTV

US

Kawasaki

Japan

Oregon steel

US

Kobe

Japan

Stelco

Canada

Republic

US

USS

US

Roanoke

US

Wheeling

US

Laclede

US

Bayou

US

Nippon

Japan

Birmingham

US

NKK

Japan

Chaparral

US

POSCO

Korea

Florida

US

Sumitomo

Japan

New Jersey

US

Thyssen

German

Nucor

US

Usinor-Sacilor

France

NorthStar
Steel

US

Northwestern Steel
& Wire

US

Weirton

US
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Utilizing W ard’s linkage method cluster analysis, groupings of firms along
similar product and capability attributes were obtained. Ward’s linkage method
forms clusters by maximizing within-cluster homogeneity, resulting in groupings
of observations that are similar along a combination of attributes of the product
and resource dimensions.

This method addresses the product and resource

similarity concepts central to the strategic group literature. From this procedure,
six clusters were identified. These are indicated in Table 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80
Table 5
Strategic Groups Resulting from Cluster Analysis
Cluster

t

Product/Market

Firms

Cluster 1

4 firms:

Acme
Geneva
Oregon
Laclede

Tubing and Pipe
Shapes
Steel Piling
Plate

Cluster 2

6 firms:

Bethlehem
Algoma
LTV
USS
NKK
Weirton

Rails
Piling
Tubing
Blackplate
Sheet

Structurals
Line Pipe
Electric Sheet
Tinplate
Plate

Cluster 3

4 firms:

Dofasco
Stelco
Wheeling
Cockerill-Sambre

Tinplate
Shapes
Plate

Galvanized Sheet
Piling

Cluster 4

6 firms:

Inland
British Steel
China Steel
Kobe
POSCO

Plate
Sheet
Bars

Cluster 5

8 firms

Bayou
Birmingham
Florida Steel
New Jersey
Nucor
Republic
Roanoke
Chaparral
NorthStar
North Western
Steel & Wire

Bars
Rebar
Shapes
Sheet
Plate
Piling
Wirerod
Light Structurals

Cluster 6

6 firms:

Usinor-Sacilor
Thyssen
Nippon
Kawasaki
Hoesch
Broken Hill
Sumitomo

Wirerod
Rebar
Bar
Structurals
Shapes
Pipe
Strip
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Euclidean distance between groups
Table 6 indicates the distances betwee n cluster centroids. This table
indicates that clusters 4 and 3 are the closest (i.e., most similar), with a centroid
distance of 3.8763 and that clusters 2 and 5 are the farthest (i.e., most
dissimilar), with a cluster centroid distance of 6.8782. Note that clusters 4 and 6
are also proximal, with a centroid distance of 3.9088. Also note that clusters 3, 4
and 6 are predominantly comprised of firms from Europe, Asia, and Canada,
while clusters 1, 2, and 5 represent primarily U.S. firms.
Table 6
Euclidean Distances Between Groups
Cluster

1

2

3

5

4

6

1

_

4.7892

4.2700

4.2256

4.3074

4.9514

2

4.7892

_

5.1999

5.0406

6.8782

4.6993

3

4.2700

5.1999

-

3.8763

4.6218

4.7907

4

4.2256

5.0406

3.8763

_

4.8862

3.9088

5

4.3074

6.8782

4.6218

4.8862

-

4.7751

6

4.9514

4.6993

4.7907

3.9088

4.7751

-
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CATEGORIZATION OF COMPETITIVE ACTIONS
AND RESPONSES
Over the three-year research period, 487 actions and 262 responses were
identified. Three-quarters of the actions were categorized as "non-price actions";
25% were identified as "price actions."

Price increases over the three-year

period were the dominant type of price move. Of the 262 responses, 79.8% were
price responses, and 20.2% were non-price responses.

Table 7 summarizes

these data.
Table 7
Summary of Actions and Responses
Year

Price
Action

Non-Price
Action

TOTAL

1993

53

96

149

1992

21

144

165

1991

17

156

173

TOTAL

91

386

487

Year

Price
Response

Non-Price
Response

TOTAL

1993

119

17

136

1992

64

27

27

1991

26

9

9

TOTAL

209

53

262

To be consistent with Chen (1988), the types of competitive moves were
categorized. The most common type of action taken across groups was a pricing
action, followed closely by an

"upgrade" (i.e., investment in plant and
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equipment), and then by a cutback in operations or facility closure.

Table 8

summarizes the action categories.
Table 8
Categories of Actions Observed
Action Type
Upgrades (Plant & Equipment, Capital Investment)
International Actions
Cutbacks / Plant, Facility Closures
Changes in Organization Structure
Market Expansions/ New Facilities
Process Innovations
Divestments (Sale of Operating Units, Equipment)
Joint Ventures Joint Agreements
Product Innovations
Regulatory Actions
Mergers/Acquisitions
Operations Restarts
Market Retrenchments
Pricing Actions
TOTAL

Frequency
14% 66
11% 56
10% 50
8% 38
8% 39
7% 36
5% 25
4% 20
4% 19
2% 10
3% 12
2%
9
1%
6
18% 91
487
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TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated an expected relationship between the likelihood of a
response to an action and the origin of an action (in-group, out-group). A higher
frequency of response is expected to actions initiated by firms in the responder's
strategic group.

The

responses made over the 1991 to 1993 period were

identified as being made to an in-group action or an out-group action.

The

resultant frequencies of the observations were then compared to those
frequencies expected if there were no influence from group membership.

Table

9 summarizes the observed frequencies and expected frequencies of in-group
and out-group responses.

The resulting %2 = 5.10, which is greater than the

expected level (3.84) at the .05 level of significance.

Hypothesis 1, therefore, is

supported: firms were more likely to respond to within group actions than to
actions arising from outside the strategic group.
Table 9
Results of Hypothesis 1 TestrResponse Type by Actor's Group Membership
Expected
Frequency
113

Observed
Frequency
130

Calculated
Chi-square
2.55

Out-group

113

96

2.55

Total

226

226

5.10 (df= 1)

Response Type
In-group
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Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that firms would take longer to respond to out-group
actions than to in-group actions.

For each response identified in the test for

Hypothesis 1, the time lag in days was calculated between the response date
and the action date.

Therefore, if a firm made a response, as reported in

American Metal Market, to another firm in its group on 12/6/93 and the action
occurred on 12/1/93, the lag for this in-group response was recorded as five
days. The mean response lag was calculated for in-group responses (10.2 days)
and out-group responses (17.1 days).

Table 10 gives the results of the test for

the difference between in-group response means and out-group response
means.

Hypothesis 2 is supported at the .01 level of significance (p=.0000):

there is a difference between mean response rates to in-group and out-groups
actions, with firms responding, on average, seven days sooner to in-group
actions as compared to out-group actions.
Table 10
Results of Hypothesis 2 Test: Response Lag by Actor and Responder
Group Membership
n

Mean

Standard Deviation

In-group

134

10.2

10.1

Out-group

107

17.1

13.8

f-value

4.49

df=239

p=.0000

Response Lag

Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 expected a relationship between response lag (RL) and the
height of the mobility barriers (MOBAR) between groups. MOBAR is given by
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the Euclidean distance between groups (ref. Table 5.2).

Only out-group

responses were utilized for this test, because the relationship of interest is that of
the mobility barriers between groups, and the lag in initiating a response.

For

each out-group response, the response lag and the Euclidean distance between
the responding firm’s group and acting firm’s were identified. For example, if a
firm in strategic group 1 made a response to an action by a firm in strategic group
2, the response lag in days and the Euclidean distance between the two groups,
in this case 4.7892, were recorded for the competitive event (i.e., the
action/response pair). Table 11 summarizes the regression equation.
The data were analyzed with the Minitab statistical analysis software
package. The results of the regression analysis of RL on MOBAR indicate that
MOBAR is a significant predictor of response lag (p=.007) and that the
regression equation derived from the analysis is also significant (F=7.54,
p=.007). The equation indicates that MOBAR is negatively related to response
lag.

Because Hypothesis 3 was stated as non-directional (i.e., two-tailed),

Hypothesis 3 is supported: response lag does vary with the height of the mobility
barrier between actor and responder.

Specifically,

response lag varies

negatively with the height of the mobility barriers. The closer the strategic group
of the outside actor to the responder's strategic group the longer a period of time
passes before a response is made.

In comparison, responses that are more

rapid are made to actions arising in groups that are separated by a greater
distance (i.e., higher mobility barrier).

The significance of this finding is

discussed in Chapter 6.
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Table 11
Results cf Hypothesis 3 Test: Regression of Response Lag on MOBAR
Equation
Predictor
Constant
MOBAR

RL = 35.11 - 3.36 MOBAR
St.Deviation
Coefficient
35.11
6.853
1.223
-3.358

F = 7.54, p=0.007, R-sq. = 6.9%
p-value
f-ratio
0.000
5.11
0.007
-2.75

Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 investigated whether responses matching (i.e., imitating) an
action were related to group membership of the actor and responder. Each in
group response was identified as either matching or non-matching the acting
firm's move. The same was done for out-group responses.

Table 12 presents

the contingency table resulting from the frequency counts of matching and non
matching responses to in-group and out-group actors.

The data indicate that

there is a significant relationship between in-group/out-group response and
whether the response is a match or non-match to an action. Firms responding to
in-group actors are more likely to match the action; when responding to non
group actors, the action is not likely to be matched (%2 = 22.9, d f= 1, a = .05).
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Table 12
Results of Hypothesis 4 Test: Response Type by Actor's Group
Membership

Source of
Action
In-group

Matching
Responses
Observed (Expected)

Total

Observed (Expected)

115 (99.21)

66 (81.79)

181

16 (31.79)

42 (26.21)

58

Out-group
Total

Non-matching
Responses

131

108

239

Chi-square = 22.919 df= 1

Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 stated that firms responding to an action were expected to
form a hierarchy, or pecking-order, to actions arising within groups. Actions in
strategic groups and the responses they generated were identified from the
action-response data collected for this study. However, not every firm in a group
responded to every action. Because this situation resulted in missing data in the
actor-responder matrix, this hypothesis was not testable using the nonparametric Friedman test for the comparison of rank-ordered data. This test is a
non-parametric equivalent to ANOVA, but, because the cell values are based on
the ranking of firms on the occurrence of interest (in this case response lag to an
in-group action) the test cannot handle missing data. While this hypothesis was
not statistically testable due to the distribution of the data, visual inspection was
utilized to deduce the possible response hierarchies within groups.
The two most active groups were identified: strategic group 2 (SG2) and
strategic group 5 (SG5).

Within group 5, whenever Nucor made a move,
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Chaparral was most frequently the first respondent, responding to 54% of
Nucor's moves that generated an in-group response.

Chaparral was closely

followed by Northwestern Steel and Wire, which was first respondent to 46% of
Nucor's moves that generated an in-group response. With moves initiated by
Chaparral and responded to in-group, Northwestern

Steel and Wire was

predominately the first respondent (91%) among responding firms. Northwestern
was also a primary respondent to moves initiated by Bayou Steel.

In cases

where Bethlehem Steel initiated actions that were responded to in group 2, USS
was the most common first respondent (66%), followed by LTV (33%). When
actions were initiated by USS, Bethlehem was most often the first respondent
(66%), followed by LTV (33%). Based on these observations, there does appear
to exist a "pecking order" to actions made within groups.

While these

observations do not empirically validate Hypothesis 5, they do suggest that a
consistent response order, or "pecking order" exists to actions made within
groups.
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SUMMARY
This chapter presented the results of the cluster analysis of firms in the
U.S. steel industry, and the strategic groups formed by analysis of the product
and resource variables identified in Chapter 4.

Six groups were identified.

These groupings were then used to test the relationships regarding response
characteristics presented in Hypotheses 1 through 5, to determine if strategic
groups have an influence on the competitive interaction in an industry as
captured by the Communication-lnformation Model of Competitive Interaction
presented as discussed in Chapter 2.
The findings indicate that response likelihood is related to the source of
the action, i.e., firms were more likely to respond to in-group actions. Firms also
responded more quickly to in-group actions. As the distance between strategic
groups increased, response lag decreased.

Firms that responded to an action

were more likely to imitate the actions of in-group firms. The empirical support for
the hypotheses implies that strategic groups do influence competitive interaction.
The primary thesis of this study is, therefore, supported.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study was two-fold. The first objective was to extend the
generalizability of the CIP model to a different industry domain from which it had
been applied and from which theory regarding the model had been developed.
Support for four of the five hypotheses indicates that the model and the theory
upon which it is built do generalize through large-scale empirical investigation to
an industry beyond the U.S. airline industry. The second objective of the study
was to determine if the strategic group construct had an influence on competitive
interaction in a focal industry. In this study the strategic group construct of the
Strategic Management and I/O economics research streams was identified as a
potential proxy for the homophily construct of communication-information theory.
As a proxy, the strategic groups construct would be expected to exhibit similar
associations as homophily with key variables of the CIP model.

Competitive

interaction in the U.S. steel industry was observed through the application of the
Communication-lnformation Processing Model of Competitive Interaction. In this
study, Hypotheses 1 through 4 were supported at significant levels. The support
of these hypotheses, which were developed by applying the theoretical reasoning
of the strategic group literature to the constructs of the CIP model, strongly
suggests that the strategic group construct may well indeed have an influence on
competitive interaction in the industry observed.
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COMPETITIVE RESPONSES: LIKELIHOOD, LAG,
MATCHING AND HIERARCHY
The strategic group literature presented in Chapter 3 delineated how the
strategic

group construct,

as

a

proxy for the

homophily construct

of

communication-information processing theory, was expected to influence the
action-response dynamics of competitive interaction through the latter construct's
proposed influence on awareness, capabilities and motivation.

The empirical

support for Hypotheses 1 through 4 clearly identifies a relationship between
strategic groups and competitive interaction, as captured by the CIP model.
Hypothesis 1
The support for Hypothesis 1 suggests that firms are more likely to
respond to actions made by group members than by non-group members. It can
be deduced from theory that greater awareness of group member firms
(Harrigan, 1985; Caves & Porter, 1979) may contribute to this greater likelihood
of in-group response.

However, these researchers proposed that greater

awareness of mutual dependence would lessen the level of rivalry (competitive
interaction) in-group. The support for this hypothesis suggests support for the
proposition of Cool and Diereckx (1987) and Hergert (1987) that firms in groups
are more strongly competitive (i.e., stronger rivals). It can also be deduced that
the within-group resource similarities may provide the basis of capability
necessary to organize a response to an in-group action.

The grouping

methodology maximizes homogeneity within and heterogeneity between groups,
resulting in groups that are dissimilar in product scope and resource profiles.
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Since resources beget capabilities, the findings suggest that it may be easier for
firms to muster the capabilities to respond to in-group actions and that it is more
difficult (i.e., less likely) for firms to respond to out-group actions. Motivation may
also play a role in this finding. Capabilities provide a foundation for competitive
advantage (Barney, 1991).

Since competitive advantages may be competed

away if they are not unique and inimitable, not only may it be easier for withingroup firms to respond to one another due to resource similarities, but the
potential loss of an incremental competitive advantage may motivate firms to
respond more quickly to within-group actions.
We must recall that the level of threat, within the CIP framework, is
assessed 'real-time' as the action and the possibilities of response are being
cognitively processed by the potential respondents' upper echelons. Therefore,
due to the perceived impact on competitive advantage, a move by a strategic
group member, operating in similar product/market space, may be perceived at
the time the information is assessed as a greater threat, resulting in a greater
likelihood of response as compared to a move by a firm in another group,
operating in dissimilar product/market space.
It must be recalled that the strategic group construct was used as a proxy
for homophily, and that homophily is proposed to influence competitive
interaction through awareness, capability and motivation. The archival nature of
the research design did not allow for the relationship between strategic group
membership and awareness, capability and motivation to be specifically teased
out at this stage. The redress for this issue is discussed in the section presenting
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the limitations to the current study.
Hypothesis 2
The data support the hypothesis that it takes longer (i.e., higher response
lag) for firms to respond to out-group actions compared to in-group actions.
Whether the responses were made to in-group or out-group actions, there must
have been some motivation to respond to the actions, since, according to Chen
and MacMillan (1992), motivation is a necessary condition for response. The lag,
therefore, could be explained as a difference in the responders’ awareness of the
actions or the responders’ capability.

These findings provide support for

Harrigan's (1985) claim that firms in the same group are more aware of each
other, suggesting that it takes longer for firms to become aware of the action, or
the degree of threat an action presents, by an out-group firm.
Harrigan's premise is that in-group firms can interpret communications
from other group members more readily that those from outside the group.
These findings appear to substantiate that premise.

Response lag should be

short if a firm is aware of an action, is motivated to respond, and has the
capabilities to respond. The greater response lag between groups indicates that
firms may not be aware of an out-group action, or, if aware, it takes time to
process the impact that the move has on the firm.

This impact provides the

motivation to respond. Given the motivation, the dissimilarity of resource profiles
may limit the capabilities of a firm to respond.

This limitation in capabilities

contributes to response lag, as firms attempt to reconfigure or acquire assets or
reassess their position to respond; reconfiguring, aquiring and reassessing take
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time (Mascarenhas & Aker, 1992; Cool & Diereckx, 1993).
The finding for Hypothesis 2 also supports the concept that past resource
investments limit the decision alternatives available to top management
(Ghemawat, 1990; Tang & Thomas, 1994). From a decision making perspective,
responses to similar competitors utilizing similar strategies and similar resources
to compete in similar markets may be more of the programmed versus non
programmed variety. Programmed decisions are more easily and quickly made
and implemented than non-programmed decisions.

On the other hand,

responding to out-group actions may require more non-programmed decisions to
accommodate "new" information passing through the sense-making process.
Non-programmed decisions take longer to make and implement.
This characterization of the decision types applied to competitive
situations can be inferred from the cognitive simplification and cognitive framing
that strategic groups are said to provide to the decision-making process. Since
Feigenbaum and Thomas (1990) refer to strategic group members as referents
to firms within group, the actions from these firms may pass through the sensemaking process as structured problems.
Hypothesis 3
The data support the hypothesis that response lag varies with the height
of the mobility barriers between groups.

This hypothesis was stated without

directionality due to the equivocality of previous findings in strategic group
research and due to the conflicting arguments that have been conceptualized.
The finding that response lag is negatively related to the height of mobility
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barriers is perhaps the most important finding in this study. This finding indicates
support for the line of reasoning in the strategic group literature that groups with
a greater strategic distance, as measured by Euclidean distance (i.e., higher
mobility barriers), are more intense rivals than groups that are closer.

The

empirical support for this proposition in the literature has been limited.

This

finding, therefore, lends support to the proposition that the greater the strategic
distance between groups the greater the rivalry between groups. Because of the
equivocal findings regarding this proposition, the hypothesis relating response
lag and Euclidean distance merits testing in other industry contexts in order to
determine if this finding holds in other industry domains. Since the responses to
in-group actions were eliminated from the data pool for the test of this
hypothesis, and the mobility barrier between firms in the same group is zero, the
finding of support for Hypothesis 3 implies that an inverted U-shape relationship
exists between response lag and distance. This is deduced from combining the
finding of Hypothesis 2 with the finding from Hypothesis 3.
The implication of this finding for the Communication

Information

Processing Model of Competitive Interaction is that there may be a response
hierarchy to actions among groups. First, given an action, firms are more likely
to respond and respond in a more timely manner to in-group firms.

Second,

firms are not as likely to respond to out-group actions, but when they do, there
may be a greater awareness of and motivation to respond to out-group firms at a
further distance, even though capabilities are dissimilar.

Third, firms in out

groups that are "close" may only require careful watching to interpret the impact

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97
of their actions, rather than mounting an all-out quick response.
But, why do firms from distant groups appear to elicit a quicker response
than firms in closer groups? The theory behind the CIP model would argue that
motivation may be the driver in the difference in response lag to near out-group
and distant out-group firms. According to Chen and Miller (1994), response lag
is lower when motivation to respond is high. When the responding firms assess
the action as a significant, credible threat, they are motivated to respond.
One explanation to the diffemtial response lag may lie in the threat that an
action presents from the perspective o f the responding firm's upper echelon.
Firms from distant groups may pose a greater perceived threat (i.e., provide
more motivation to respond) than firm s from closer groups.

The "message"

interpreted from the action of the distant out-group may be understood as more
threatening than the action of a near out-group. For example, firms from distant
groups could be interpreted as "invading" a group's product/market space with
different, or innovative, resource profiles, therefore requiring a swift response to
parry the action. Porterian strategy would call for the responding firm to make a
pre-emptive statement (i.e., response) to the incursion of the out-group firm. If a
move is interpreted as a credible threat, response lag will be lower than if the
action is not interpreted as a significant threat by the responding firm (Chen &
MacMillan, 1992).
Figure 5 details the possible association among action source, threat
assessment, and response lag in terms of a responder's awareness of an action
by either a distant or near out-group firm. From the theory underpinning the CIP
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model, high response lag is associated with a low assessment of threat. The
finding of support for Hypothesis 3 would appear to contradict the influence that
strategic groups may have on awareness, as earlier stated. This contradiction,
however, can be explained.

Response lag is measured from the time of the

action to the time of the response. It is beyond the scope and methodology of
the present study to assess awareness lag; there is no means to directly assess
the relationship between awareness and Euclidean distance. The awareness lag
for actions of distant out-group firms may be greater than for near out-group
firms. The present finding does suggest, however, that, once aware, responders
react more quickly to distant out-group firms. Thus, if we decompose response
lag into two components we would have the following statement:

Rl — Al + REl

Where,
R l = response lag

A l = awareness lag (the elapsed time from action to the time of the
responder's awareness of the action)
REl = Reaction lag (the elapsed time from the responder's awareness of
the action to the response made to the action)
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Figure 5
Strategic Group Distance, Threat Assessment and Response Lag
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Thus, the current finding regarding Hypothesis 3 suggests the following
relationships between near-group and distant-group awareness lag, as depicted
in Table 13. The identification of the possible decomposition of response lag into
awareness lag and reaction lag has not been advanced in prior research of the
application of the CIP model, nor has the potential contingent relationship
between the distance of the group source of an action and the levels of
awareness and reaction lags.
Table 13
Contingent Relationship Between Group Proximity, Awareness Lag and
Reaction Lag
Near-group

Distant-group

Awareness
Lag

LOW

HIGH

Reaction Lag

HIGH

LOW

The current findings reflect a very constrained time period in the history of
the focal industry. To suggest that the relationship between response lag and
group distance is static would be flawed without further investigation across
different time periods and in different industries.

Even though the stability of

groups has been identified as being long-term, the dynamics of group relations
have barely been probed. The relationships among groups, over time, may be
more dynamic than the static nature indicated in the current literature. If further
investigations consistent with the one presented here identify a dynamic setting,
this could be one explanation for the equivocality of previous findings regarding

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

101
the levels of rivalry and group distance.
The research done to date on the CIP model does not include a study on
the relationship between response lag and the quality (i.e., outcomes) of
response. The study of decision speed and outcomes, however, is a growing
area in strategic management research
Eisenhardt, 1989, 1992).

(Bourgeois & Eisenhardt,

1988;

Are quick responses to distant out-group actions

consistent with the responding firm's intended strategy, or do they represent a
step on the pathway to an emergent strategy? Do firms that take longer to react
to distant out-group actions fare better in the long-run than firms that are quick to
react/respond? These questions are open to further study in the exploration and
application of the CIP model. Application of the CIP model in such a manner
would contribute to the development of the

relationships

between top-

management consensus, decision speed and performance.
Hypothesis 4
The sample firms were roughly seven times more likely to match an action
when responding to an in-group actor than when responding to an out-group
actor. This finding addresses the constructs of motivation and capabilities and
the influence the strategic group appears to have on these elements of the CIP
model. The analysis of Hypothesis 2 suggests that there is motivation to respond
to in-group actions. Given this motivation, how would a firm respond?

The

analysis of Hypothesis 4 suggests that firms may respond to in-group actions by
matching the action. It can be deduced from theory and the current findings that
the similarity of resource profiles, hence capabilities,

may be the operative
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construct in the relationship presented in Hypothesis 4.

Firms with similar

resource profiles have similar capabilities and can better match a response to an
action. Firms responding to a firm with different resource profiles (i.e., from a
different group) may not have the full array of capabilities, nor understand how
the other firm is using its capabilities, to match the action. The responding firm(s)
formulates a response to answer the interpreted threat, but may not have the
resource profile to match the action.

Although firms appear to respond more

quickly to distant groups, as suggested by Hypothesis 3, responding firms may
not have the capability to match the response to the actions.
Hypothesis 5
Although the data did not allow for an empirical test of this hypothesis, the
qualitative observations may be relevant to the strategic group literature.
Assessing the behavior of firms within groups is necessary for understanding
inter-firm interaction at the group level. This type of assessment has been limited
in previous strategic group research (Baum & Kom, 1996).
The current observations are consistent with the proposition made by
Chen (1996) regarding competitive asymmetry. This concept holds that firms
are not symmetrically competitive:

Firm A may perceive Firm B as a primary

competitor, but Firm B perceives Firm C as its primary competitor, not Firm A.
For example, from the data, when Nucor moves, Chaparral is predominantly the
first respondent, indicating a consistently strong motivation on the part of
Chaparral to respond to Nucor.

However, when Chaparral acts, Nucor rarely

responds, but Northwestern is the primary first respondent.
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response order may indicate that Nucor and Northwestern do not interpret the
actions taken by Chaparral as posing the same level of threat, or that Chaparral
and Northwestern do not have exactly the same capabilities to respond to Nucor.
In assessing the differential response between Nucor and Northwestern to an
action taken by Chaparral, if a lag in awareness of Chaparral’s action is not the
source of response lag, and differences in capability between the firms is not the
source of the reaction lag, then the primary component of response lag could be
the reaction lag attributable to motivation. Given that the CIP model holds that
the responder assesses the action for information content, the upper echelon of
Nucor and Northwestern, through their respective sense-making processes, may
be making different interpretations regarding the degree of threat posed by
Chaparral's actions.
Based on the observations resulting from the failed empirical analysis of
Hypothesis 5, there is an indication that the behaviors within group are not
uniform. Although not statistically testable, the observations of the data form a
basis for grounded theory and the inter-relationships within groups bear further
investigation to extend strategic group research into considering firm-level
behavior within groups.
The observed interactions also make the consideration of first-mover
advantages within group a potentially fruitful area for further research. Strategic
Management literature places a heavy emphasis on first-mover advantages
(Leiberman & Montgomery, 1988). This concept, however, is generally assessed
at the industry level. It would be expected that each group identified in an
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industry would have one or more consistent first-mover, early-follower, and latefollower cohorts. Future assessment of these cohorts is relevant due, in part, to
the potential performance implications (Leiberman & Montgomery, 1988) within
group. The identification of these co-horts within a group would perhaps explain
the equivocal performance findings among firms within groups that has beset
strategic group research (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990).
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STRATEGIC GROUPS
The finding that groups 2 and 5 are separated by the greatest Euclidean
distance (i.e., mobility barriers) reinforces our intuitive reasoning about this
industry: 'integrateds' and 'minimills' form very distinct groupings. Even though
no dummy variable was set to capture the inherent difference between integrated
firms (group 2) and minimill firms (group 5), the difference in this dimension was
captured by the resource variables identified for inclusion in the cluster analysis.
Prior research on strategic groupings in this industry has broken the
industry into 'integrateds' and 'minimills' on the basis of qualitative assignment.
The cluster method, using product scope and resource variables, not only
reinforced this finding, but also indentified two additional groupings within the
U.S. integrated category.

Therefore, in the strictest sense of strategic group

theory, it is incorrect to identify the industry as being comprised of only two
groups.
While

the

groups

were

identified

using

an

accepted

empirical

methodology, there is the opportunity to bridge the quantitative and qualitative
methodologies of the strategic group literature.

Porac and Thomas (1990),

Bogner and Thomas (1993), and Reger and Huff (1993) advocate going beyond
the quantitative tradition, to apply qualitative techniques to capture the cognitive
aspect of strategic groups. The empirical support for Hypotheses 1 through 4
provides evidence that the quantitatively obtained objective groupings may
influence interaction among firms in and between groups. The next step in this
line of research is to determine the strategic groupings by applying a qualitative
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method similar to that used by Reger and Huff (1993) to capture the cognitive
schema at work in the industry.

This would allow the empirical comparison of

the findings and provide for an empirical extension of the theoretical work of
Bogner and Thomas (1993). By comparing and combining the results obtained
through varying methodologies, we obtain more complete theories.
The concentrated groupings of foreign firms in the U.S. steel industry are
also an interesting finding resulting from this study. Foreign firms were included
in groups 3, 4, and 6, even though this was not an attribute directly captured in
the grouping methodology.

Among themselves, these firms utilize similar

resource capabilities and comparable product scope to compete in the U.S. steel
industry. It is also not surprising that, during this time period, the firms in groups
3, 4, and 6 made more international moves than firms in groups 1, 2, and 5.
According to the literature on environmental scanning, the Asian and European
markets would have had greater saliency for groups 3, 4, and 6 (Boyd & Fulk,
1996). When it comes to the lack of out-group response to these international
actions, the explanation from Communication-lnformation Theory would be that
the U.S. groups (1, 2, and 5) were not aware of the actions, or if aware did not
interpret these international actions as credible; if they did, they may have
perceived that they did not have the capability to respond.
Many of the international moves made by firms in groups 3, 4, and 6 were
relationship-building actions with steel companies in the Soviet Union, China,
Vietnam and greater Asia, or moves to establish presence for Europe 1992. An
enlightening extension to this research would be to identify whether the non
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response of U.S. firms was due to a lack of motivation (i.e., no threat was
interpreted) or due to an assessment of a lack of capability to reply to these
actions.
Non-response to the international actions of groups 3, 4, and 6 also brings
to light the potential impact of governmental regulations and trade barriers on the
Communication-lnformation

Processing

Model

of

Competitive

Interaction.

Because prior research on the model has not included an international
component, the relationship of governmental regulations and trade barriers on
response/non-response behavior has not been addressed. Thus, for example,
did U.S. firms not respond to actions to form market relationships in Vietnam due
to lack of awareness, motivation, and capability or to the existence of
governmental proscriptions against Vietnam?

The same question could be

posed regarding the other international actions taken and the existence of either
real or perceived trade barriers. Although governmental regulations and trade
barriers might be broadly categorized under the "capabilities" construct of the
model,

they should

be

separately identified,

perhaps

as

environmental

constraints on firm-level capabilities, and assessed for their relationship to
response, response likelihood, and response lag.
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EMPIRICAL AND BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATIONS
Competitive Intensity
Because the number of responses to actions increased over the period,
when compared to the relatively flat growth of the actions taken over the period,
a response/action ratio was calculated.

Table 14 gives the result of this

calculation. It reveals that the competitive intensity of the industry, as measured
by total responses per year in proportion to total actions taken per year,
increased during the period of the study.
Table 14
Competitive Intensity
Year

Price
R/A Ratio

Non-Price
R/A Ratio

Total
R/A Ratio

1993

2.5

.18

.91

1992

3.05

.19

.55

1991

1.53

.06

.20

As seen in Table 14, the competitive intensity of the industry increased
over the period of the study from a Total Response/Action ratio of .20 to .91 This
indicates that actions were generating more responses in 1993 than in 1991.
Although not a specific focus of this study, this finding does merit explanation.
According to the running editorial commentary and reporting in the American
Metal Market,

the market for steel and steel products was characterized as

improving over the period with forecasts of increases in demand and sales. Such
increases characterize a munificent environment.

On the surface, this data
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suggests that competitive interaction increases with environmental munificence.
This is certainly contrary to the propositions of Hannan and Freeman (1977), who
argue that rivalry increases when resources in the niche are low and decreases
when resources are abundant.
relationship

between

Because of this potential contrary finding, the

munificence and competitive

interaction should

be

specifically tested in other industry contexts.
Boundary Spanners
Examination of the relationships of actions and responses between firms
and among groups highlighted the existence of "boundary-spanning" firms. For
example, there were several occasions where Bethlehem (group 2) responded
directly to a move made by Nucor (group 5). However, when other firms in group
2 responded, the response was reported as being to Bethlehem, not Nucor. In
this way the awareness and significance of an external action was communicated
to the group at large, through the actions of the initial group respondent. This
same type of behavior was observed for Nucor for actions occurring in Group 2
and 6. This observed behavior could arise from two possible sources: (1) the
groups

were

incorrectly

defined

by the

clustering

algorithm

and

the

product/resource variables chosen; and, (2) the period in question represents a
transition period in the structure of the strategic groups.
It is not directly possible to determine if the observation of boundaryspanning behavior is the result of incorrectly drawn groups.
empirical results of the

study suggesting support for the

However, the
hypothesized

relationships provide an indication that the groups, for this study, were not
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incorrectly identified. This problem would be greatly clarified by comparing the
results between objectively and subjectively derived groupings as suggested
earlier.

The comparison would either substantiate the boundary spanning

behavior, or indicate that it was an artifact of incorrectly identified groups (i.e.,
that a firm "should" have been categorized in group X rather than group Y). If the
latter is not the case, then the existence of boundary-spanning behavior in firms
from different strategic groups is an area that merits further research. This would
signify that, not only do firms utilize group members as referents, but a few
specific firms utilize out-group firms as referents as well, and, by their response
to this out-group action, provide an in-group action to which other in-group firms
may respond.
The behavior may also be the result of a transition in the structure of
strategic groups. Although it has been demonstrated that strategic groups are
stable over long periods of time, group membership does change.

The

boundary-spanning behavior observed in this study may indicate that firms are in
the process of transitioning from one group to another. Previously, research on
strategic groups captured the change in groups in a static manner: in year X a
firm was a member of group A, in year X+5 a member of group B. The concept of
a dynamic transition of firms from one group to another reinforces the proposition
made by Bogner and Thomas (1993) that economic transactions lay the
groundwork for the objective dimensions of group structure, and provide for the
emergence of the subjective, cognitive groups which frame future transactions.
From the perspective of Peteraf and Shanley (1997), the boundary-spanning
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firms may be undergoing a change in strategic group identity, modeling their
competitive behavior and actions after a new group of referents. By applying the
model and methodology used in this study, a more dynamic picture of group
change and firm transition from group to group, with emphasis on the reasons for
transition, would be obtained.

This would be a significant extension of the

strategic group literature, providing richer information on why and how groups
evolve.
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LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
A limitation on the study’s findings results from the focus on a single
industry.

A broader test of the hypotheses to several industries concurrently

would provide a more rigorous test for the influence of strategic groups on the
response variables of the CIP model.

Few strategic group studies, however,

have considered more than one industry at a time. A noted exception is found in
Hergert (1987).
The dependence on an archival newspaper source is the greatest
limitation to the application of the particular methodology applied in this study.
The requirement that specific terminology be present to record an event as a
response limited the number of responses to actions. Although it may have been
deduceable that a move by a firm was indeed a response to a specific action of
another firm, if the article did not include "responding to . . ., following . . ., similar
to . . ., in response to . . ., etc.” or other key phrases clearly linking a response to
an action, the move could not be coded as a response.

However, since the

publications that cover this industry on a daily basis are limited, and other
industries face this same constraint in press coverage, this is not a limitation that
is easily overcome.

Rather than using a retrospective methodology (i.e.,

reviewing past issues of a specific trade publication) a more prospective
methodology might be warranted. The problem here, however, is the length of
time (years) necessary to accumulate sufficient actions and responses for
analysis. The positive contribution of a more prospective method would be that,
with the participation of key decision makers at firms in the focal industry, the
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correlates of awareness, motivation, and capabilities within groups could be more
closely examined.

This type of design would certainly contribute to a greater

understanding of how strategic groups influence awareness, motivation and
capability.

For example, the empirical support for Hypothesis 3 suggests that

firms in group 2 are more motivated to respond to firms in group 5, the most
distant group, than to groups that are more proximal (groups 1, 3, 4). Using a
prospective method with key informants would allow the research to probe why
the actions from the furthest group are perceived to be a greater threat. It is not
possible to do this using a retrospective method.
Another shortcoming of the method lies in the journalistic approach to
reporting on the focal industry. If the time between action and response is long,
the reporter/editor may not reference the firm making, or the date of, an initial
action. This may have resulted in “actions" which would have more appropriately
been classified as responses.

Again, due to the retrospective nature of the

methodology applied, longitudinal studies in this areas will suffer from the same
limitation.

In contrast, a prospective longitudinal design would permit the

researcher to ask specific questions to tease out whether a move is indeed an
action, or a much-delayed response to another firm's move. The next step in this
line of inquiry, then, is to develop and apply a prospective, longitudinal research
design that addresses some of the questions raised by the results of the current
study.
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CONTRIBUTIONS
This study makes several contributions to the two theory bases upon
which it was founded. First, it is the only major large-scale replication of Chen's
work to date that extends the generalizability of the CIP model of competitive
interaction to the manufacturing sector.

It substantiates several of the key

constructs (response lag, response likelihood, response order) of this research
stream and their validity outside the fast-paced, highly interactive U.S. airline
industry. Second, the support for the hypotheses corroborates the proposition of
the

CIP literature

base

that

homophily has

an

influence

in

inter-firm

communication and information and, hence, competitive interaction.

This

concept had been proposed, but never directly incorporated in an empirical study
of the Communication-lnformation Processing Model of Competitive Interaction.
The empirical support for Hypotheses 1 through 4 suggest that the relationships
between homophily and competitive interaction and strategic groups and
competitive interaction are transitive.

As an equivalent construct, strategic

groups may have similar influences on awareness, capability and motivation as
homophily is proposed to have. Although the relationships may be deduced from
theory, the findings of this study lay the foundation to examine the specific
influence that the strategic group construct has on awareness, motivation and
capability using finer-grained research methodologies than those previously
applied in strategic group research.
The contributions to the strategic group research stream are just as
significant. First and foremost is the evidence that strategic groups may have an
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impact on competitive interaction, as captured by the Communication-lnformation
Processing Model.

Response lag, response likelihood and response type are

associated with the similarity of group membership between actor and responder;
with group membership capturing the characteristic of similarity among in-group
firms along product/market scope and resources. The major contribution here is
the potential inverted U-shaped relationship between response lag and mobility
barriers and the match/non-match of response made to in-group and out-group
actions.

This finding implies that, from a responding firm's perspective, close

firms (in-group) and distant firms (out-group) are both rivals, but that motivation
to respond and the response type reflects the source of the action. The
implication is that, within group, firms move quickly to respond to and match the
actions of other in-group firms, while they respond quickly, but may not be
capable of matching the actions of firms in distant groups. Thus, while both in
group and distant out-group actions may motivate a response exhibiting a low
response lag, (i.e., both are perceived as threats), the different resource profiles
across groups limits the degree to which the responder can mount a quick,
matching response to distant out-group actions
As previously stated throughout the presentation of this study, the
strategic group construct was used as a proxy for the homophily contruct. Most
strategic group research

has focused on group formation, stability and the

relationship to performance (Barney & Hoskisson, 1994).

It has rarely been

applied as a construct outside of the traditional I/O economics stream as a
means to explain, support, or refute relationships in models and theories in other
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areas of Strategic Management research (Bogner, 1993).
Identifying the apparent equivalency of the strategic group construct with
the homphily construct, therefore, is a significant contribution to the strategic
group research stream. The findings of support for Hypotheses 1 through 4 lend
credence to the continued use of the strategic group construct in Strategic
Management research.

Contrary to the suggestions made by Barney and

Hoskisson (1990), the strategic group construct has validity, and is not a mere
artifact of methodology. The discovery that the strategic group construct-based
on the similarity of entities in a group-reflects the relationships proposed of a
construct from a different field, itself based on the similarity of individuals in a
communication-information exchange, signifies that the strategic group construct
in not merely an artifact. The identification of a potential relationship between the
strategic group construct and the elements of the CIP model indicate that
strategic groups have an influence on behavior of the firms within them.
If the strategic group were not an equivalent construct to homophily, it
would not have demonstrated the expected results. Had this been the case, the
study would have found that the strategic group construct is not equivalent to
homophily and that the strategic group does not influence competitive interaction.
If the strategic group construct were a mere artifact, it wouid not have served as
a proxy for a similar construct from an unrelated theory base.

The study's

findings reinforce the theoretical arguments of the role of strategic groups in firm
and group behavior (Bogner & Thomas, 1993) and augments the credibility of the
few empirical works (Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1994) that have begun to examine
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firm-level behavior within groups.
A potentially significant contribution to the strategic group stream of
research is the possible discovery of a response hierarchy, or pecking order,
within strategic groups.

Feigenbaum, Hart and Schendel (1996) suggest that

firms utilize other group members as referents.

The finding from the current

study suggests that a dominant referent may exist within a group, and also
suggests that not all firms are referents for all other firms within the group.
Clarification of the referent role and relationships among firms in groups and the
role these referents have regarding group- or firm-level conduct is needed. A
second contribution to strategic group research is the potential existence of
boundary spanning firms.

Further research may reveal that these firms are,

indeed, in two different groups, or are transitioning from one group to another.
Strategic group research has historically focused at the group level, typically
considering conduct within groups

as

unimportant.

Moving towards

a

consideration of the firm-level behaviors within group would help to clarify firm-togroup transition and its antecedents. A better understanding of group-level and
firm-level interaction may also serve to guide research into a clarification of the
influence between the strategic group and performance relationship.
Finally, the inclusion of international companies operating in the U.S.
market of the focal industry makes an important contribution to the CIP model.
The non-response of firms in predominantly U.S. firm-comprised groups to the
actions of foreign firm-comprised groups suggests that there may be other
structural factors, which would enter the CIP model as elements of the
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competitive environment, that influence the interaction between domestic and
foreign firms operating in the domestic market of the focal industry.
Contributions to Managers
Most strategic group studies have been conducted to examine the
relationship between groups and performance, with little attention to the conduct,
or behavior, of firms within groups. This is slowly changing, as recent studies
suggest (Baum & Kom, 1996).
contributions to managers.

Strategic group studies have suggested few

As strategic group studies further investigate the

relationships between the group construct and manifestations of conduct, or
behavior, such as response lag, the construct may become more relevant to
practicing managers.

This study suggests an association between group

membership and conduct. An emerging understanding of this relationship may
better help managers realize the potential constraints of their cognitive schema,
decision outcomes, and resulting group structures on their actions and responses
in the competitive arena.
Response lag has been shown to be related to performance (Chen &
Hambrick, 1995). In prior studies the determinants of response lag have been
represented by organizational variables, such as organizational slack, size, and
external orientation (Smith, Grimm & Gannon, 1992).

The present study

indicates that industry structure, in terms of strategic groups, is also associated
with response lag.

Thus, while it may benefit the organization to drive response

lag down to zero, only a portion of the determinants may be directly influenced by
managerial discretion. The strategic groupings in the industry, as a determinant
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of response lag, are only slowly altered by managerial decision, as evidenced by
group stability over time.

This factor renders the effects of the strategic group

persistent over a time period.
This study also lends support to the contention made by Feigenbaum and
Thomas (1994) that group actions reinforce group norms, as members are more
likely to respond to members and more likely to match in-group

actions.

Managers must question, however, the appropriateness of matching actions
within the action/response context. Is a matching response taken because it is
the

most expedient course, or would a non-matching action be more

appropriate? In this decision, the cost of the response lag, in terms of potential
market share and credibility, needs to be weighed with the potential costs and
benefits of "pushing the envelope" of the firm's capabilities to formulate a non
matching response. Can every response to a group action be non-matching?
Perhaps not. But, managers should realize that some degree of their response
discretion is bound by the past actions and decisions which, over time, have
given rise to the group structure of their industries.

An understanding of the

influences of group structure may provide managers clearer insight on when it
may be more beneficial to "go with the flow" or buck the trend.
What about non-matching response to out-group actions?

A non

matching response may be appropriate in the initial stages of out-group
response, to communicate to the out-group firm(s) that the action will not go
uncontested.

However, at some point the managers of responding firms must
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assess the limitation of their capabilities and either cede to the incursion of the
out-group, or invest in extending/increasing the capabilities of the firm.
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FUTURE RESEARCH
The current study could not assess the direct association between
strategic group membership and awareness, motivation and capability.

This

assessment was not within the intention, scope or design of the study.

The

present research achieved its goal:

identifying the influence of the strategic

group on the CIP model due to its nature as a proxy for homophily.

Had this

equivalence not existed, there would be no basis for determining the relationship
between the strategic group, awareness, motivation, and capability.

With the

apparent equivalence of the strategic group construct and the homohily construct
established, the investigation of the relationships with and the direct influence of
the strategic group on awareness, motivation and capability is warranted.
Studies in this vein would allow for a better understanding of how firms view,
understand, and process

information exchange,

in terms

interactions, with in-group firms and out-group firms.

of competitive

Why, for example, the

apparent inverted U-shaped relationship between mobility barrier hieght and
response lag.

Is this the result of managerial discretion or a manifestation of

determinism, an old and on-going debate in organizational science (Hrebiniak &
Snow, 1985).
Direct assessment of the relationship between the strategic group and
awareness for example, would allow for the theory base resulting from studies in
environmental scanning to be applied.

We would expect that in-group firms

would be more salient to a potential responder than out-group firms and, due to
this saliency, be more frequently scanned for information (Boyd & Fulk, 1994).
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But this type of environmental scanning research has not been conducted at the
strategic group level. Direct assessment of the relationship between awareness,
motivation, and capability and the strategic group construct would also allow for
an analysis of the sense-making and decision-making processes at work and the
potential influence, if any, of the strategic group. There is preliminary evidence
(Feigenbaum & Thomas, 1994) that firms reinforce group conduct.

Closer

investigation of the sensemaking process within the CIP framework and group
influence would probe this preliminary finding.
The suggestion brought out in the discussion of the study findings that
awareness and capability may interact to influence the decision type (i.e.,
programmed, non-programmed) made by the firm is an interesting one.

This

potential interaction between awareness, capability, group membership and
decision type underscores the interactive nature of the structural and cognitive
aspects of organizational science and deserves to be addressed. For example,
under what conditions are programmed versus non-programmed decisions
applied to responses to actions, both in-group and out-group?

Does the

composition of the upper echelon (the top-management team) mediate the
relationship between actor, responder, group membership and the most likely
decision type applied?
Another area of investigation further probes the relationship between
response lag and mobility barrier height. First, is this finding in the focal industry
constrained by economic factors (i.e., recession) of the early 1990's from which
the data were taken? Second, is this finding generalizable to other industries?
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Third, does this relationship hold over a longer period of time, or is it a dynamic
one that may change over a long period of time, as cognitive schemas, businesslevel strategies, top management teams, and industry conditions change?
Regardless, the present findings suggest that we question our understanding of
the role of mobility barriers in strategic group research and also question the
justification of the relative conceptual equivalence between strategic distance
and mobility barries, as operationalized by the Euclidean distance resulting from
cluster analysis.
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SUMMARY
This study bridged the Communication-lnformation Processing Model of
Competitive

Interaction

and

the

strategic

group

literature

of

Strategic

Management. The CIP model presents communication-information theory as a
means of modeling, analyzing, and understanding competition among firms in an
industry.

This is a comparatively new theoretical approach in Strategic

Management, beginning in the mid-1980s. The strategic group literature takes its
root in Bain (1956). The groups present within industries are purported to result
from the choices top-level managers make regarding their firm’s strategic profile,
asset base, product/market scope, and resource allocations.

These choices

constrain future decisions.
From the intersection of these two streams of research hypotheses were
developed and tested. The empirical results suggest that strategic groups may
have an influence on the response dynamics of competitive interaction, more
specifically, that firms are more likely to respond, and respond more quickly, to
within-group actions than to actions from outside the group.
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Tutored at-risk students in several business subjects, economics, and statistics
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